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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Nationwide, millions of families are expected to lose their homes to foreclosure over the 
next several years.1 Falling home prices and tighter credit markets have made it difficult or 
                                                        
* The authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order to reflect equal contribution to this article and the 
data presented herein. John Eggum is a 2008 graduate of the University of Iowa College of Law. Katherine 
Porter is an Associate Professor of law at the University of Iowa. Tara Twomey is a consultant to the 
National Consumer Law Center and a Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School. The authors thank Ann 
Casey, Gina Lavarda, Brian Locke, and Nece McDaniel for their research assistance.  
1 See ELLEN SCHLOMER ET AL., LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND 
THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 3 (2006) (estimating that 2.2 million families with subprime loans have lost 
or will lose their homes to foreclosure over the next few years); Foreclosures to Affect 6.5 mln Loans by 
2012-Report, REUTERS, Apr. 22, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN2233380820080422 (citing the Credit Suisse Report 
dated April 22, 2008, that estimated as many as 6.5 million foreclosures by the end of 2012, equating to 
12.7% of all residential borrowers). In May 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke observed that 
1.5 million homes were in some stage of foreclosure in 2007, an increase of 53% over the previous year. 
Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Columbia Business 
School’s 32nd Annual Dinner (May 5, 2008), available at   
Electronic copy available at: ht ps: /ssrn.co /abstract=1349151
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349151
2 
 
impossible for families to refinance their way out of unaffordable home loans. The safety net 
provided by appreciating real property values has crumbled, leaving homeowners at risk of 
serious financial distress. For many families, homeownership has become a financial liability, 
rather than a financial asset. 
To date, responses to the foreclosure crisis have left homeowners who are in default on their 
mortgage loans with few options. Foreclosures continue to outpace loan modifications,2 despite 
being identified as a preferred strategy for reducing the number of foreclosures.3 The federal 
government and the credit industry largely have confined their efforts to voluntary programs that 
offer, at best, temporary or limited aid, such as forbearance agreements or short-term 
modifications.4 When other alternatives are unavailable or insufficient, families may turn to 
bankruptcy to prevent the loss of their home. 5 Bankruptcy permits homeowners to halt 
foreclosures and cure defaults on their mortgage loans by repaying missed payments over a 
period of years. However, families face serious challenges in saving their homes using 
bankruptcy law. In today’s market, a large fraction of struggling homeowners may have mortgage 
obligations that are not affordable.6 Bankruptcy law does not permit debtors to modify the terms 
of mortgages secured by a principal residence.7 This limitation on restructuring home mortgage 
loans may pose an insurmountable barrier to families who are trapped in unaffordable loans. Such 
families may be unable to avoid foreclosure using the bankruptcy process because they cannot                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20080505a.htm). Foreclosures continue to 
surge in 2008. See Press Release, RealtyTrac Staff, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 23 Percent in First 
Quarter (Apr. 29, 2008), available at  
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=4566&accnt=64
847 (stating that foreclosure filings for first quarter 2008 were up 23% from the previous quarter). 
2 In September 2007, Moody’s Investor Services surveyed sixteen mortgage servicers that accounted for 
80% of the market for subprime loans and found that most of those companies had modified only about 1% 
of loans with interest rates that reset in January, April, and July 2007. MICHAEL P. DRUCKER & WILLIAM 
FRICKE, MOODY’S SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICER SURVEY ON LOAN MODIFICATIONS 1 (Sept. 21, 2007), 
available at http://americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/Moodys_subprime_loanmod.pdf. In a 
December 17, 2007 update, Moody’s reported that the number had only slightly increased to 3.5%. 
AASHISH MARFATIA, U.S. SUBPRIME MARKET UPDATE: NOVEMBER 2007, STRUCTURED FINANCE 2 (2007). 
Recent data from the HOPE NOW Alliance indicates that foreclosure starts in the third quarter of 2008 
(575,000) are nearly double the number of loan modifications for the same period (264,000).  HOPE NOW 
Loss Mitigation National Data July 07 to October 2008, available at 
 http://www.hopenow.com/site_tools/data.php.  Similarly, recent information from the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency shows that in August 2008 servicers modified a mere 4,402 loans out of the 31 million 
loans guaranteed by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae while delinquencies climbed to 2.03% of the total loans. 
See Emily Flitter, Loan Mods at 4k in August for GSEs, American Banker (Nov. 26, 2008). 
3 See, e.g., Shelia C. Bair, Chairwoman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at American Securitization 
Forum Annual Meeting (June 6, 2007) (“The immediate task is to sustain homeownership by ensuring that 
servicers have the flexibility they need to make prudent loan modifications.”). 
4 See, e.g., Anna Marie Kukec, Trend Won’t End Soon, So What’s Being Done?, DAILY HERALD, Nov. 
28, 2007, at 1, (highlighting the temporary and limited extent of programs intended to help with the 
foreclosure crisis).  
5 See Posting of Bob Lawless to Credit Slips: A Discussion on Credit and Bankruptcy, 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/05/foreclosures-an.html#more (May 21, 2008, 19:39) 
(suggesting higher bankruptcy filing rates may be tied to the foreclosure crisis). 
6 Some of these families may have unaffordable loans because of easy underwriting standards used at 
the time of loan origination. Another large subset of families may have adjustable-rate loans with mortgage 
payments that have sharply escalated after loan origination.  
7 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006). By contrast, bankruptcy debtors may modify mortgage debt on 
investment property and second homes. See id. 
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keep up with their ongoing mortgage payments or cannot do so while curing the defaults on their 
mortgage loans.  
This Article explores the intersection between home affordability and the potential of 
bankruptcy to help families save their homes from foreclosure. Using an original data set of 
homeowners who filed chapter 13 bankruptcy, this Article analyzes the relationship between 
housing costs and income for bankrupt families. This Article finds that more than two-thirds of 
bankrupt families live in unaffordable or severely unaffordable housing according to standards 
used by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.8 These families must devote a large 
proportion of their incomes to housing costs, which could jeopardize their chance to save their 
homes and lower the odds that they complete their bankruptcy cases successfully. Amending 
bankruptcy law to permit the modification of the terms of home mortgages could reduce 
unaffordable housing costs and enhance the usefulness of bankruptcy as a tool to address the 
current foreclosure crisis.  
Part II of this Article explains the benefits and limitations of using chapter 13 bankruptcy as 
a home-saving device. Part III describes the methodology of a mortgage studythat contains over 
1700 chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed by homeowners (“Mortgage Study”), and explains the 
metrics used to assess the affordability of these debtors’ housing costs. Part IV presents the 
Mortgage Study data on the housing affordability for bankrupt families. Part V considers the 
implications of these findings for improving the bankruptcy system and for crafting effective 
policy responses to the rising number of foreclosures.  
 
II.  BANKRUPTCY AS A HOME-SAVING DEVICE 
 
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, homeowners facing foreclosure have 
often turned to bankruptcy as a last resort to try to save their homes.9 A bankruptcy filing halts a 
pending foreclosure.10 Debtors who file a chapter 13 bankruptcy case can cure any defaults on 
mortgage loans over a period of years.11 This right to cure is applicable even if the creditor has 
accelerated the loan and even if state law or the loan contract does not provide such a right.12 This 
right to repay mortgage arrearages over time offers families the opportunity under federal law to 
save their homes from foreclosure.  
To retain a home in chapter 13 bankruptcy, the law generally requires bankruptcy debtors to 
make their ongoing monthly mortgage payments as well as to make additional periodic payments 
to repay any arrearages on the mortgage loan.13 As a result, chapter 13 bankruptcy is well-suited 
to aid families who have defaulted on their mortgage loans due to a temporary loss of income 
(e.g., unemployment, illness, divorce). If debtors have recovered from this temporary setback at 
the time of bankruptcy, they may have sufficient income to make ongoing mortgage payments as 
well as make payments under their bankruptcy plans to repay any past due amounts. Homeowners                                                         
8 See infra Part IIIB. 
9 Raisa Bahchieva et al., Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of Homeownership, in 
CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005) (stating that chapter 
13 bankruptcy is frequently used by families who face foreclosure and explaining its benefits over chapter 
7 bankruptcy for homeowners).  
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 362. A limited exception to this general rule for repeat filers was enacted in 2005. 
See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 302, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)). 
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). 
12 See, e.g., In re Robinson, 285 B.R. 732, 738 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2002) (stating that federal 
bankruptcy law right to cure could not be frustrated by state law). 
13 See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chapman (In re Chapman), 135 B.R. 11, 14 (Bankr. 
M.D. Pa. 1990) (noting practice of allowing debtors to extend their plans to repay arrearages on 
mortgages). 
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facing foreclosure because they are overwhelmed with unsecured debts, such as credit card or 
medical bills, may also benefit from a chapter 13 bankruptcy. For these debtors, bankruptcy can 
reduce the amounts owed to unsecured creditors to a fraction of the total debt, thereby freeing up 
income to permit debtors to meet their mortgage payments. Debtors who have rebounded from 
temporary income loss or who need to address large unsecured debts stand the greatest chance of 
saving their homes in bankruptcy.  
Embedded in this description of the benefits of chapter 13 bankruptcy for homeowners in 
financial distress is a crucial assumption—that these families have incomes at the time of their 
bankruptcy filings that are sufficient to permit them to meet their future mortgage payments and 
other living expenses. To receive a bankruptcy discharge and to cure defaults on their mortgage 
loans, families need to stay current on their ongoing mortgage obligations. A family’s success in 
saving its home in bankruptcy may turn in large part on the relationship between its current 
income and its housing costs.  
An example from a bankruptcy case in the Mortgage Study sample is illustrative.14 This 
bankrupt family had a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage loan with an interest rate of 7.35%. The 
monthly mortgage payment for principal and interest at the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing 
was $503. Other housing costs such as taxes, insurance, water, sewer, electricity and heating fuel 
added another $286 per month to the housing expenses, which totaled $789. The family’s 
monthly gross income at the time of the bankruptcy filing was $1908. This family’s housing costs 
subsumed 41% of its income. When it filed bankruptcy, the family owed a past due debt to its 
mortgage creditor of $5234 in principal and interest and $1228 in fees and costs. To cure the 
default and save its home from foreclosure, this family needed to repay this total arrearage of 
$6462. Currently the most common loss mitigation option offered by mortgage companies to 
struggling homeowners is a repayment plan. Yet, this non-bankruptcy option is not likely to be 
workable for this family. Under a typical twelve-month repayment plan, this family would have 
to pay an additional $538 per month for one year. This would increase the family’s total housing 
costs to $1327 per month and push the debtor’s housing costs-to-income ratio to 69%. That is, a 
repayment plan outside of bankruptcy would require the family to commit a little more than two 
of every three dollars that it earned as income to its mortgage obligations. Additionally, this 
nonbankruptcy repayment option would leave the debtor with only $581 in residual income after 
meeting its housing costs to pay for food, transportation, telephone, medical costs, credit card 
debt payments and other miscellaneous expenses. 
By contrast, in bankruptcy, this family could cure the arrearage on the mortgage loan over a 
period of up to five years as part of a chapter 13 repayment plan.15 The arrearage of $6462 could 
be repaid over sixty months, which translates to $108 per month to the mortgage creditor to cure 
the default. This additional payment boosts the family’s housing costs-to-income ratio up to 44%. 
While this increase may still be a challenge for the family to manage, it is likely to pose a 
significantly smaller obstacle than the most common repayment plan available outside of 
bankruptcy. In this case, the debtors’ actual bankruptcy plan proposed a monthly payment of                                                         
14 This example is based upon the petition, schedules, chapter 13 plan and mortgagee’s proof of claim 
in Mortgage Study case ED VA 38 (on file with Katherine Porter). Each case in the Mortgage Study sample 
was given a unique identifier assigned by the researchers (ED VA 38, in this instance). The letters signify 
the judicial district where the case was filed. The numbers represent the sequence of the case in the sample. 
We do not refer to the cases by their court-supplied case numbers because we do not wish to violate the 
privacy concerns of the debtors whose cases were randomly selected for inclusion in the Mortgage Study 
sample. Bankruptcy court records, however, are public documents and all cases are on file with author 
Katherine Porter, as noted.  
15 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325. The length of the plan is affected by the debtor’s income and family 
size, as well as whether or not unsecured claims will be paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1325(b)(1), 
(b)(4). 
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$328, which covered not only the mortgage arrears, but also tax arrears, the trustee payment,16 
attorney fees and a 100% repayment of all debts owed to unsecured creditors.17 Two years later 
this family is faring well in bankruptcy. They appear to be current on their ongoing payments to 
their mortgage creditor and their bankruptcy repayment plan remains pending.  
As the above example demonstrates, bankruptcy can be a powerful tool for fighting 
foreclosure because it can improve a family’s chances for catching up on past, missed mortgage 
payments. However, the ability of homeowners to cure mortgage defaults in bankruptcy is 
significantly undermined when their monthly mortgage payments before bankruptcy are severely 
unaffordable. Debtors who have suffered a permanent decline in income before bankruptcy are 
less likely to be able to take advantage of their right under bankruptcy law to repay their debts 
through a chapter 13 repayment plan  Similarly, debtors suffering from payment shock as a result 
of teaser rates on adjustable-rate mortgages,18 or those who have been saddled with unaffordable 
loans from the moment of loan origination19 will find it more difficult to save their homes under 
the current bankruptcy laws. 
Homeowners with mortgage payments that overwhelm their incomes face much greater 
challenges in saving their homes in bankruptcy. The right to cure a mortgage default under § 
1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code does not itself permit a homeowner to modify terms of a 
mortgage loan. Section 1322(b)(2) sets forth the general rules regarding modification of claims in 
bankruptcy, permitting debtors to modify the rights of secured and unsecured creditors. Some of 
the ways that secured claims may be modified include altering the payment schedule, reducing 
                                                        
16 The chapter 13 trustee collects payments made by chapter 13 debtors and disburses those payments 
to creditors in accordance with the debtor’s confirmed chapter 13 plan. See First Bank and Trust v. Gross 
(In re Reid), 179 B.R. 504, 507 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The chapter 13 trustee is generally paid a commission or 
fee for administering these payments. See 9 AM. JUR. 2D BANKRUPTCY § 588 (2006). The fee is typically 4–
10% of the amount being paid through the plan. Id. 
17 The trustee will pay a dividend to unsecured creditors in accordance with the debtor’s chapter 13 
plan. See In re Phelps, 149 B.R. 534, 535 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting trustee payment of dividends to 
unsecured creditors). In chapter 13, debtors may modify claims of unsecured creditors by paying them less 
than the full value of their claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). Unsecured creditors may receive a dividend 
of 0 to 100% on their claims. See Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(stating varying range of dividend percentages). A dividend of 100% means the unsecured creditors will be 
paid in full, a dividend of 50% means the unsecured creditors will be paid fifty cents on the dollar and a 0% 
dividend will produce no return to the unsecured creditors. After unsecured creditors are paid the dividend 
specified in the debtor’s chapter 13 plan, any remaining debt is discharged upon completion of the plan. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1328.  
18 See generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES, AND HOW WE GOT HERE 6, 20 
(2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/archive/Documents/Reports/10.25.07OctoberSubprimeReport.pdf 
(identifying the root of the subprime mortgage crisis as the prevalence of 2/28 and 3/27 teaser loans). 
19 See generally STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, DATA REP. NO. 1, ANALYSIS OF 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE 10 (2008) (stating that more than 30% of subprime and 
Alt-A ARMs are already at least thirty days past due before any rate reset). Over the past several years, 
many borrowers were unwittingly pushed into unaffordable loans by unscrupulous mortgage brokers or 
lenders. See, e.g., Mortgage Market Turmoil, Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Alan M. White, Community Legal 
Services, Inc., on behalf of Jennie Haliburton), available at  
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/haliburton.pdf (describing elderly homeowner whose monthly 
payment for principal, interest, taxes and insurance consumed 62% of her social security payment and left 
her with only $664 a month for all other expenses such as food, medicine, and utilities).  
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the contract interest rate,20 or “stripping down” the amount of the claim to the value of the 
collateral.21 However, the rule permitting the modification of secured claims is limited by 
additional language in the same section that creates an exception for certain mortgage loans. The 
exception prohibits the modification of “a claim secured only by a security interest in real 
property that is the debtor’s principal residence.”22 This exception is commonly known as the 
“anti-modification” rule. This language means that bankruptcy debtors cannot change or adjust 
the terms of their home mortgages. This restriction on loan modification can make it nearly 
impossible for debtors with unaffordable mortgage payments to save their homes from 
foreclosure through the bankruptcy process.  
Because families remain obligated to make their future mortgage payments according to the 
original loan terms, those who have severely unaffordable mortgage loans may be more likely to 
fail in chapter 13 bankruptcy. Sometimes, the high housing costs began at the time of loan 
origination. For example, a debtor from the Mortgage Study was saddled with a monthly 
mortgage payment of $2465, which was nearly equal to her monthly gross income of $2699.23 
The debtor’s mortgage loan was a six-year fixed-rate loan with an interest rate of 11%. The loan 
was an “interest only” obligation with a $271,465 balloon payment due at the end of the six-year 
term. The debtor’s bankruptcy court records listed an additional monthly contribution from a 
family member of $1322. However, even with these additional funds the monthly mortgage 
payment consumed 62% of household income without taking into consideration real estate taxes, 
insurance and utilities. Unable to make the monthly mortgage payments going forward, the 
automatic stay preventing foreclosure on the home was lifted by the court within just a few 
months of the bankruptcy filing. Despite seeking relief in bankruptcy, this debtor lost her home to 
foreclosure.24  
Similarly, debtors suffering from payment shock on adjustable-rate mortgages may also be 
unable to use bankruptcy to save their homes. The so-called exploding adjustable-rate mortgage is                                                         
20 See, e.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (holding that in modifying the interest 
rate on a car claim being paid under a chapter 13 plan, the bankruptcy court should use the prime rate, 
adjusted to reflect potential risk, taking into account “such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the 
nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan”). 
21 “Stripping down” or bifurcating a secured creditor’s claim means to divide the claim into two parts: 
the secured portion, which is equal to the value of the collateral, and the unsecured portion represented by 
any amount owed over the value of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); see American Gen. Fin. v. 
Paschen (In re Paschen), 296 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2002) (defining “secured” and “unsecured” 
portions of a bifurcated claim). Section 506(a), which authorizes such bifurcation, provides that a creditor’s 
claim “is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such 
property.” 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The section serves two purposes: (1) it limits the estate’s liability on a 
secured claim to payment up to the actual value of the collateral, and (2) it permits the under-secured 
creditor to have an allowed unsecured claim and share on par with the other allowed unsecured claims. 
Through this process, the secured creditor’s rights in the collateral are preserved, but its rights to the 
debtor’s property other than the collateral are limited and no greater than those of other creditors. Thus, the 
Code prevents the secured creditor from obtaining an unfair advantage in the bankruptcy case over the 
unsecured creditors out of proportion to the true value of its security interest. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2); see Nobleman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1993). 
23 This example is drawn from the bankruptcy court records of Mortgage Study case ND CA 5 (on file 
with Katherine Porter). Notably, the debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs reveals that the debtor’s 
income between 2002 and 2005 never exceeded $28,000 per year ($2333 per month), yet the loan, which 
was originated in September 2005, from the outset had a monthly mortgage payment of $2465.  
24 The bankruptcy court records do not reveal the house’s ultimate disposition but the county records 
show a trustee’s deed was filed after a notice of default and notice of trustee sale, consistent with a 
completed non-judicial foreclosure. (land record on file with Katherine Porter).  
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the mortgage product that dominated the subprime market from 2004 to 2006.25 It is usually 
characterized by a fixed interest rate for the first two years of the loan, followed by an adjustment 
of the interest rate every six months thereafter.26 Often, these loans were structured with an initial 
“teaser” or discounted interest rate for a period of two or three years. After the initial period of 
the fixed interest rate expires, the loan’s interest rate, and accordingly the borrower’s payments, 
usually increase significantly. In one case from the Mortgage Study, a Minnesota family had an 
adjustable-rate mortgage with an initial teaser interest rate of 7.99% and a monthly principal and 
interest payment of $1781.27 While the debtors’ income remained stable from prior years, in the 
seven months before bankruptcy the interest rate on their loan adjusted twice. These changes 
caused the interest rate on their loan to escalate to 10.99%, giving the family a monthly payment 
of $2780. The payment shock from the interest adjustment added $1000 per month to the family’s 
mortgage obligation. After the interest rate adjusted on the loan, the debtors did not make any 
payments on it. At the time of bankruptcy, the debtors’ housing costs, including mortgage 
payment (principal, interest, taxes, and insurance) and utilities for the home (water, sewer, and 
garbage) were equal to 67% of the debtors’ income. Within one year of filing chapter 13 
bankruptcy, this family faced a motion from its mortgage creditor to lift the bankruptcy stay of 
foreclosure. The court granted the motion, giving the creditor permission to foreclose under state 
law. Although the bankruptcy court records do not detail the final outcome, this family probably 
lost its home. Bankruptcy did not permit this family to address the real obstacle to keeping its 
home—unaffordable ongoing mortgage payments.  
Bankruptcy law’s current prohibition on modifying home mortgage loans is a serious 
limitation on bankruptcy’s usefulness as a home-saving device. Families who have recovered 
from temporary income declines or whose primary financial problem is large unsecured debts 
may succeed in saving their homes in bankruptcy. However, the families who are in financial 
distress because they are trapped in unaffordable home loans may find little relief under existing 
bankruptcy law. The remainder of this Article constructs an empirical measure of the affordability 
of bankrupt families’ housing costs in relation to their current incomes and analyzes the 
implications of these findings for bankruptcy’s potential as a foreclosure prevention system.  
 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
 
The data presented in this Article comes from the Mortgage Study, an original database of 
homeowners in bankruptcy. This section briefly describes the methodology of that study28 and 
details the affordability standard that we use to measure the housing costs of bankrupt 
households.  
                                                         
25 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, A SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/snapshot-of-the-subprime-market.pdf (reporting 89–93% of 
subprime mortgages made from 2004 to 2006 had exploding interest rates).  
26 The interest rate on an adjustable-rate mortgage is usually based on the value of an index, such as 
LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) or comparable U.S. treasuries, plus a fixed amount called the 
margin. The margin in Mortgage Study case D MN 22 (on file with Katherine Porter) was 7.74%, and the 
LIBOR index on the date of consummation was 1.186%. See BBA, 2003 – HISTORIC LIBOR RATES, 
http://www.bba.org.uk/content/1/c4/24/38/Aug03.xls. The fully indexed rate on the date of consummation 
was 8.93%.  
27 This example is based on the bankruptcy court records in Mortgage Study case D MN 22 (on file 
with Katherine Porter).  
28 For a more extensive recitation of the Mortgage Study’s methodology, see Katherine M. Porter, 
Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
(manuscript at 13–16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027961). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1349151
8 
 
A.  Mortgage Study 
 
The Mortgage Study is a large, multi-state study of chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors who are 
homeowners. The study’s main objective was to develop comprehensive data on the intersection 
of mortgage lending, homeownership, and bankruptcy.29 The National Conference of Bankruptcy 
Judges’ Endowment for Education, a non-profit and non-partisan organization that funds basic 
research and education about bankruptcy, provided financial support for the study.30 Katherine 
Porter and Tara Twomey are co-principal investigators of the study. 
The Mortgage Study built a sample of 1733 chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.31 To be included in 
the study, the bankruptcy debtor had to own a home.32 The cases were filed during the month of 
April 2006.33 Because of rapid changes in the mortgage market in the last few years, the data may 
not reflect the effects, if any, of the current “foreclosure crisis” on the bankruptcy system. For 
example, the sample may underrepresent the affordability problems created by adjustable-rate 
mortgages, which continued to grow in popularity until late in 2006. On the other hand, the data 
may be more representative of the usual situations of households that file bankruptcy to save 
homes during the thirty-year period since the Bankruptcy Code’s adoption in 1978 of the law 
restricting the modification of home mortgages.  
The sampling procedure was to select every fifth case in each judicial district included in the 
sample. In this way, the sample reflects the number of chapter 13 filings per district, so that 
districts with higher numbers of chapter 13 filings are represented accordingly.34 The sample 
includes bankruptcy cases filed in forty-four judicial districts, which represent twenty-four 
different states.35 These states all permit non-judicial foreclosure of residential mortgages. We 
limited the sample in this regard because we believe that homeowners may be more likely to file 
bankruptcy as an anti-foreclosure measure in non-judicial foreclosure states where foreclosure is 
usually easier and faster.36                                                         
29 Id. at 15. 
30 The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and its Endowment for Education (“Endowment”) 
are not responsible for the data or findings presented in this Article, which are solely the responsibility of 
the authors. In funding the grant, the Endowment does not endorse or express any opinion about the 
methodology utilized, or any conclusions, opinions, or results contained in any report, article, book, or 
other writing based on the research funded by the Endowment.  
31 We excluded chapter 7 cases from the sample because homeowners are less likely to file chapter 7 
bankruptcy than chapter 13 bankruptcy. See Bahchieva et al., supra note 9, at 104 (reporting that 
homeowners are “nearly 50 percent more likely to file for Chapter 13 than Chapter 7”). Homeowners prefer 
chapter 13 because it contains special provisions to permit homeowners to cure defaults on their mortgages 
by repaying arrearages over time through their repayment plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325 (2006).  
32 While all cases in the sample were filed by homeowners, four percent of these homeowners did not 
report owing any mortgage debt at the time of bankruptcy.  
33 The initial coding of the data occurred in October or November 2006. We intentionally allowed for 
this lapse of time to try to ensure that the court records were substantially complete when we coded the 
data. We rechecked the court records approximately eighteen months after the initial filing to check for any 
additional objections to mortgagees’ proofs of claim.  
34 For example, in a district with few chapter 13 filings, such as Wyoming, only two cases are in the 
sample. At the other extreme, the sample contains 164 cases from the Northern District of Georgia because 
that district has a large number of chapter 13 cases filed. 
35 In 2006, the chapter 13 bankruptcy filings in these states accounted for 61% of all chapter 13 filings 
in the nation.  
36 See Porter, supra note 28, at n.83 (citing BARLOW BURKE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 336 (2006) 
(“[Power of sale foreclosure] is cheaper than judicial foreclosure and takes less time.”)); see also 1 GRANT 
NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 635 (2002) (discussing the extensive procedures 
involved in judicial foreclosures). 
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The data come from the public court records in each debtor’s case. The electronic filing 
system for federal court pleadings, PACER,37 was used to access most of the records.38 In each 
case, data was coded from the debtor’s bankruptcy petition and schedules of assets and liabilities. 
Data was also drawn from the case docket and from any proofs of claim and attachments thereto 
filed by mortgage creditors or their agents. Approximately 150 pieces of data were coded for each 
case.  
This Article analyzes the housing affordability of bankruptcy debtors in 1713 cases. Twenty 
cases were eliminated from the complete Mortgage Study sample because of irregularities in 
these few debtors’ schedules.39 To calculate home affordability, we adopted the standard of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) as detailed infra in the next section. 
That metric requires two main pieces of data: income and housing costs.  
Data on income were coded from Schedule I of each debtor’s bankruptcy schedules.40 This 
income figure represents the debtor’s actual monthly income at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 
Comparing these income data with debtors’ housing costs provides a robust measure of debtors’ 
abilities to pay their housing expenses at the time they filed chapter 13 bankruptcy.41 
A debtor’s “housing cost” as referred to in this Article is a combination of four expenses. 
Each of these expenses is reported on debtors’ bankruptcy records on Schedule J: (1) mortgage 
payment;42 (2) property tax payment; (3) insurance payment; and (4) utility payments.43 The                                                         
37 PACER is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, the online system for 
accessing federal court records.  
38 We thank the chief judges of each district (with one exception) in the Mortgage Study for granting 
us a research waiver of PACER fees. The Southern District of Texas, a consolidated court in which the 
District Court determines whether to grant a fee waiver, denied our application for a fee waiver. When 
PACER did not appear to contain complete court files, we obtained paper records. 
39 Some cases were eliminated because of missing information, such as no income given on the 
appropriate schedule despite an indication that the debtor was employed. Others were eliminated because 
the debtor reported a mortgage payment of zero despite listing a mortgage debt on the schedule of secured 
debt. Before elimination, each of these cases was individually reviewed for coding error.  
40 The Mortgage Study also coded data on income from each debtor’s Form B22, which is the form 
that collects the data for the “means test” used to determine a bankruptcy debtor’s eligibility for bankruptcy 
relief and their repayment obligations in chapter 13. The Form B22 income figure, although labeled 
“current monthly income,” is in fact an average of the debtor’s historical income for the six months before 
the bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2006); see also B22C (Official Form 22C) (Chapter 13) 
(01/08) (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_08_Official/B_022C_0108f.pdf. 
Thus, the Schedule I income data are more representative of a debtor’s income when a debtor decided to 
file chapter 13 and attempted to retain their homes. To satisfy our curiosity, we did analyze debtors’ B22 
income in relation to housing costs. The results were largely similar, but because Schedule I income (time 
of bankruptcy filing) was often somewhat lower than Form B22 income (average income in months before 
bankruptcy), the findings on housing affordability were somewhat less grim than those that are the focus of 
this Article. We note that we have no reason to know the direction of change of debtors’ incomes after 
bankruptcy filing. While some households may improve their financial prospects, others may find that their 
incomes continue to decline.  
41 Knowing debtors’ income at the time they took out their mortgage loans would provide an 
additional perspective on debtors’ decision-making in borrowing and the lenders’ original terms for 
underwriting the loan with regard to income. These data are difficult, if not impossible, to derive from the 
bankruptcy court records. A major barrier in this regard is the failure of many mortgagees to attach a note 
to their claim from which a loan date could be obtained. See Porter, supra note 28 (manuscript at 17) 
(showing that 41.1% of mortgage creditors did not file a note with their proofs of claim). The other 
difficulty is that the Statement of Financial Affairs that is part of debtors’ schedules provides income data 
for, at most, the three years that preceded the bankruptcy, and loan origination often preceded that period.  
42 If a debtor had more than one mortgage loan, we combined the payment on each obligation to 
calculate their total housing obligations.  
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coding procedure accounted to the greatest extent possible for whether tax or insurance were 
included in a debtor’s mortgage payment.44 Payments that were included in the utility expense 
were electricity, gas or oil, water, and sewer.45 
 
B.  Calculating Affordable Housing 
 
“Affordable housing” is a flexible and nebulous concept. The term has been invoked in 
several ways, depending on context and objective.46 HUD has made the concept of affordability 
more concrete by creating a measure that reflects the percentage of income that a household 
spends on housing costs.47 HUD then categorizes housing as affordable, unaffordable, or severely 
unaffordable based on whether housing cost divided by household income exceeds certain 
thresholds.48 A household is deemed to be living in affordable housing if its housing costs 
subsume no more than 30% of its income.49 A household is termed to have unaffordable housing 
if it commits between 30% and 50% of its income to paying housing costs.50 Severely 
unaffordable housing is defined as requiring a household to expend more than half (50%) of its 
income.51  
HUD’s housing affordability standards have shaped federal housing policy for decades.52 For 
example, HUD has issued an internal directive to mortgage companies stating that loans insured                                                                                                                                                                      
43 See B6J (Official Form 6J) (12/07) (2007), available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_006J_1207f.pdf.  
44 Some debtors included taxes and/or property insurance in their reported mortgage payment. To 
prevent double-counting, the Mortgage Study coding noted whether each debtor had indicated in the pre-
printed box on the schedule that the mortgage payment included tax or insurance. The utilities coded were 
electricity, water/sewer, and gas.  
45 Schedule J contains an “other” utility field. See id. A small fraction (45 of 1713) of debtors in the 
Mortgage Study sample entered all utilities in this field as a combined number, sometimes including cable 
television or another expense that is not part of the utility expense in the housing affordability standard. 
Because we had no way to know what portion of these combined figures was attributable to specific 
utilities, we used the entire amount of the combined utility. It is unlikely that this had any effect on the 
analysis because of the small number of schedules completed in this manner and because of the low 
amounts of combined utilities in relation to the overall housing expense figure. Specifically, the average 
and median “other” utility expenses were $162 and $113, respectively, for Mortgage Study cases  
46 See J. David Hulchanski, The Concept of Housing Affordability: Six Contemporary Uses of the 
Housing Expenditure-to-Income Ratio, 10 HOUS. STUD. 471, 475–86 (1995) (discussing the historical 
development and modern use of expenditure-to-income ratios as an affordability metric). 
47 See DAVID A. VANDENBROUCKE, HOUSING AFFORDABILITY DATA SYSTEM 11, 14 (2007), available 
at http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/hads/HADS_doc.pdf (explaining the Housing Affordability Data 
System dataset and detailing the metrics used by HUD to evaluate housing costs and burdens).  
48 See id. at 11; OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
TRENDS IN WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING, 1978–1999, at 1 (2003) [hereinafter TRENDS IN WORST CASE 
NEEDS FOR HOUSING], available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/PDF/trends.pdf.  
49 The 30% figure is the baseline HUD standard. See VANDENBROUCKE, supra note 47, at 11. The 
actual criteria used by HUD incorporates a statistical analysis of regions, area median incomes, housing fair 
market value, and area poverty levels to analyze what is affordable for a given area. Id. at 7–13; see also 
TRENDS IN WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING, supra note 48, at 1. 
50  TRENDS IN WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING, supra note 48, at 1. 
51 Id. 
52 The 30% figure is the end result of an evolving policy begun in the 1920s that suggested that all 
housing, owned and rented, should cost one week’s worth of wages (a 25% of income standard). See 
DANILO PELLETIERE, GETTING TO THE HEART OF HOUSING’S FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION: HOW MUCH CAN A 
FAMILY AFFORD? 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.nlihc.org/doc/AffordabilityResearchNote_2-19-
08.pdf. Thirty percent has been the most used standard since the 1970s. Id. at 1–5. 
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by the Federal Home Administration (FHA) may be issued only when housing payment–to–
income ratios do not exceed 31%.53 When Congress has legislated, it has demonstrated a special 
concern for those spending more than 30% of their income on housing.54 For those with severely 
unaffordable housing costs (households spending more than 50% of their incomes on housing), 
Congress has enacted laws that attempt to give even greater aid.55 The widespread adoption of the 
HUD affordability standard makes it the best available metric for assessing the challenges that 
bankrupt households may face in retaining their homes in chapter 13 bankruptcy.  
While a concrete, objective benchmark for determining affordability is a useful tool, it is not 
a perfect measure of whether a family can meet its housing expenses without undue hardship for 
the following reasons. First, the HUD standard has a fixed-time approach. For example, the HUD 
affordability benchmark assumes that income is stable and does not consider income volatility. A 
further assumption is that housing costs are fixed. However, property tax rates, insurance 
premiums, and utility costs are apt to change over time, usually increasing at least annually. For 
debtors with adjustable-rate mortgages, even their mortgage payment may change as time elapses. 
While these are real limitations, such assumptions are an inherent part of the HUD affordability 
standard. Further, the general analytical model that is used in chapter 13 bankruptcy is also a 
snapshot, moment-in-time approach that considers what the debtor can afford to pay at the time of 
the bankruptcy filing or at plan confirmation, which typically occurs a few weeks thereafter. Both 
the Bankruptcy Code and HUD use static measures to capture what is in reality a dynamic 
relationship between income and expenses. While the analytical approaches are parallel, the 
attempt is nonetheless to forecast a household’s financial future using limited data from a 
particular moment in time.  
Second, merely because the HUD standard labels housing as unaffordable does not mean 
that some Americans do not actually succeed in paying for such housing. Studies show that many 
homeowners exceed HUD’s affordability guidelines. The Joint Center for Housing Studies of 
Harvard University reports that, as of 2006, about 29.5% of all U.S. homeowners, corresponding 
to over 22 million households, have housing costs that exceed HUD’s 30% affordability 
benchmark.56 The same study also found that about 40% (8.8 million) of these 22 million 
                                                        
53 Letter from John C. Weicher, Assistant Sec’y for Hous.-Fed. Hous. Commissioner, U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees (Apr. 13, 2005), available at  
http://www.fhasecure.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/05-16ml.doc. However, that same 
directive indicates that “compensating factors” may allow this limit to be exceeded, indicating that even 
HUD views its own concept of affordability as somewhat flexible and dependent on an individual debtor’s 
situation. Id. 
54 See Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153 (amending, 
in section 122, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 1706e (repealed 
1990)), to give a special priority to loan applicants currently paying in excess of 30% of income for 
housing); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1490a(a)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring that rental rates not exceed 30% of 
adjusted income for certain low income persons, in section entitled “[l]oans to provide occupant owned, 
rental, and cooperative housing for low and moderate income, elderly or handicapped persons or families”).  
55 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(6)(A) (giving an “excess shelter expense deduction” for eligible low-
income food stamp recipient households spending more than 50% of income on housing). 
56 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2008, at 
40 [hereinafter JCHS REPORT], available at  
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2008/son2008.pdf (analyzing housing affordability 
using the same affordability metrics as this paper). The JCHS Report found that about 34.9% of all U.S. 
households (including both homeowners and renters) live in housing that exceeds HUD’s affordability 
guidelines. Id. 
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households have homes that are severely unaffordable.57 That translates into 11.7% of all U.S. 
homeowners spending more than 50% of their incomes on housing.58  
While some of these homeowners in unaffordable housing will face foreclosure because they 
cannot sustain their housing costs, it is not inevitable that high-cost homeownership efforts will 
fail. Some households, by virtue of rising income or housing appreciation, will succeed at 
homeownership, even if those households met the unaffordable benchmark at one time. Other 
households will succeed in purchasing their homes by sacrificing goods and services, such as 
internet and cable television, or by diverting income from other productive uses, such as saving 
for retirement or their children’s college educations.59 Thus, it is inaccurate to equate all 
homeownership that is unaffordable under the HUD standards as “unsustainable” because such a 
label may not mirror the reality of homeownership outcomes. Of course, the converse is equally 
true. That is, some families will lose their homes after a financial collapse despite having 
affordable housing costs. Housing affordability is a useful measure for comparing groups of 
Americans and studying homeownership expense at a moment in time, it is not an absolute 
predictor of outcome in any given situation.  
The characteristics of bankruptcy debtors will affect the likelihood that these families can 
withstand unaffordable housing costs. Most families who file bankruptcy face high debts and earn 
low incomes.60 These circumstances ratchet up the risks that such families cannot succeed in 
saving homes that are unaffordable. The HUD affordability standard is a way to evaluate the risk 
of home loss for these families in bankruptcy.  
People who file bankruptcy earn low incomes.61 Figure 1 shows that homeowners who file 
chapter 13 bankruptcies have fewer dollars to spend on expenses than most Americans. The 
average debtor in the Mortgage Study’s sample had an annual income of $43,263. The median 
debtor earned $36,348.62 In 2006, when the debtors in the study filed bankruptcy, the average 
American household earned $65,527.63 The median household had an annual income of 
$48,451.64 The data from the Mortgage Study show that chapter 13 homeowners (a subset of all 
bankruptcy debtors) earn incomes that are substantially lower than the general population of 
Americans.  
 
                                                        
57 Id. 15.8% of all households (homeowners and renters combined) live in housing that is severely 
unaffordable. Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 133 (2003) 
(discussing the increasing cost burden that homeowners acquiesce to, and explaining that, over the last 
generation, “the proportion of middle-class families that would be classified as house poor or near-poor has 
doubled”).  
60 David Himmelstein et al., Did BAPCPA Fail? The Impact of the 2005 Amendments on Families in 
Trouble, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (reporting financial characteristics of bankruptcy debtors 
from Consumer Bankruptcy Project studies in 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2007).  
61 Id. at figs. 1 & 2 (reporting incomes of bankruptcy debtors from Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
studies). 
62 These annual income figures were constructed by multiplying each debtor’s monthly income at the 
time of their bankruptcy filing by twelve months.  
63 U.S. Census Bureau, United States—Selected Economic Characteristics 2006,  
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?geo_id=01000US&qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_DP3&
ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_ (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
64 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1349151
13 
 



















Average Income Median IncomeSources: Mortgage Study (n=1713); U.S. Census 
 
This income disparity quite probably decreases the likelihood that families filing bankruptcy 
are able to comfortably exceed the 30% benchmark of affordability. The reality is that as income 
levels rise, people can afford to spend a greater percentage of their income on housing. This effect 
is the result of higher-earning households having enough absolute dollars left over for expenses 
such as food that are relatively consistent among families of all income levels. While the HUD 
standards apply to all people, regardless of whether they earn near the poverty line or in the top 
percentile of all Americans, those with relatively lower incomes will find it harder to maintain 
housing beyond the affordability benchmark.  
As an alternate measure of whether bankruptcy debtors can afford their homes, this Article 
also analyzes the amount of income debtors have left after they have paid their housing costs. 
This amount, known as residual income, has consistently been identified as an additional, critical 
element in determining housing affordability.66 Unlike the general HUD affordability metric, 
which is measured as a percentage of income, residual income is measured as an absolute dollar 
value. Thus, the residual income standard reflects the reality that some amount of certain baseline 
expenses (e.g., clothing, medicine or food) are necessarily incurred by all people, regardless of 
income level.  
The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) publishes official federal poverty 
guidelines each year.67 These guidelines set out, based on family size, the threshold income below 
which a family is deemed to live in poverty.68 These guidelines can be used to determine whether 
                                                        
65 Sources: Mortgage Study (n=1713); U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey, 
Selected Economic Characteristics: 2006 (2006), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?-
geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_DP3&-ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00. 
66 See, e.g., Steven C. Bourassa, Measuring the Affordability of Home-Ownership, 33 URB. STUD. 
1867, 1868–69, 1876 n.4 (1996) (explaining one study’s approach toward residual income and citing to 
others). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (2006). 
68 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 2006 Federal Poverty Guidelines,   
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families have a minimal level of residual income. Subtracting 30% for housing costs from these 
poverty guidelines gives the amount of money a poverty-level family would have available to 
spend on non-housing expenses. These non-housing poverty amounts can be tested against the 
incomes that bankrupt families have remaining and available after paying their housing costs. If a 
family that has an above-poverty income in fact has insufficient residual income to spend at the 
poverty level on non-housing goods, they are deemed to be living in “housing induced poverty.”69 
Most families in bankruptcy are middle class and do not earn below the poverty line.70 Thus, 
applying the HHS poverty guidelines to bankrupt families is a valuable measure of whether 
housing costs leave bankrupt families with insufficient residual income. At the heart of the 
concept of housing affordability is the idea that housing costs should not force families to live in 
poverty-level conditions.  
 
IV.  FINDINGS 
 
In this section, we present four analyses of Mortgage Study data to measure the housing 
affordability of bankruptcy debtors. First, we determine the proportions of bankruptcy debtors 
that fit the three categories of HUD housing affordability: those living in affordable housing (less 
than 30% of income spent on housing), those living in unaffordable housing (30% to 50% of 
income spent on housing), and those living in severely unaffordable housing (more than 50% of 
income spent on housing). We then compare the sample of bankruptcy debtors to all U.S. 
households, breaking down each group’s housing costs using the same standards.71 Second, we 
parse the housing affordability of bankruptcy debtors in more detail by presenting the distribution 
of housing affordability by income decile. Third, we offer a regional comparison of housing 
affordability among bankruptcy debtors. Fourth, we construct a residual income analysis to assess 
the amount of income, in dollars, that bankrupt households have left for other expenses after 
paying for housing. Collectively, these analyses are the first detailed examination of the housing 
costs of bankruptcy debtors who are trying to save their homes. These data offer insights on the 
challenges that face families that file chapter 13 bankruptcy to prevent foreclosure. 
 
A.  Housing Affordability of Bankrupt Homeowners Compared to All U.S. Homeowners 
 
The key finding of this Article is grim. As measured by the HUD standard of housing cost as 
a percentage of income, fewer than three in ten homeowners in chapter 13 bankruptcy have 
affordable housing costs. The remaining seven in ten homeowners in bankruptcy face 
unaffordable housing costs. Compared to the general population of homeowners, families trying 
to save their homes in bankruptcy are much more likely to be living in unaffordable housing.                                                                                                                                                                      
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); see, e.g., Annual Update on the 
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 70 Fed. Reg. 3848, 3848–49 (Jan. 24, 2006) (establishing 2006 poverty 
guidelines).  
69 See Nandinee K. Kutty, A New Measure of Housing Affordability: Estimates and Analytical Results, 
16 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 113, 123 (2005) (defining “housing-induced poverty” and reporting that in 1999, 
4.3% of American households not in poverty were living in housing-induced poverty, meaning that after 
paying housing costs they could not afford the “poverty basket of nonhousing goods”); see also 
PELLETIERE, supra note 52, at 13–14 (discussing the approach used by Kutty and other housing policy 
commentators). 
70 Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 115, 117, 144 (2003) (concluding that families in bankruptcy are “overwhelmingly middle class” after 
analyzing education, occupation, homeownership and income levels of debtors). 
71 Data on all U.S. households is from the JCHS Report. See JCHS REPORT, supra note 56 and 
accompanying text. 
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Figure 2 reports the data on the housing affordability of chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors and 
compares these results with all American households.  
 
Figure 2: Housing Costs as a Percentage of Income of Bankruptcy Debtors and U.S. Population72 
 
Only about 28% of homeowners that file chapter 13 bankruptcy live in affordable housing. 
Even though homeowners very frequently seek bankruptcy relief to save their homes, only a 
minority of these households have mortgage and other housing costs that subsume 30% or less of 
their income. The majority of chapter 13 homeowners (over 71%) enter bankruptcy with current 
housing expenses that are unaffordable or severely unaffordable on their current incomes. These 
households may find it difficult to keep up with the combination of ongoing housing payments, 
other expenses allowed under their chapter 13 plans, and their plan payments to repay creditors or 
cure mortgage arrearages.73  
For over one-fifth of families (21.25%) trying to save their homes in bankruptcy, more than 
half of every dollar they earn as income goes to pay for housing costs. These families meet or 
exceed the HUD criteria for severely unaffordable housing. As a group, those in severely 
unaffordable housing spend an average of $1775 a month on housing costs and have an average 
                                                        
72  Source: Mortgage Study (n=1713); Joint Center for Housing Studies 
73 Not all chapter 13 debtors are concerned with being current on plan payments until plan 
completion. Some debtors file chapter 13 intending to cure arrearages and then exit bankruptcy without 
receiving a discharge. Gordon Bermant & Jean Braucher, Making Post-Petition Mortgage Payments Inside 
Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 269 (2006). Also, some debtors are able to 
confirm plans that pay nothing to their unsecured creditors because after subtracting payments to secured 
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income of just over $2800.74 This translates into spending nearly two of every three dollars of 
income on housing, an inversion of HUD’s affordability standard that suggests that families need 
two-thirds of their incomes to meet non-housing costs.  
Chapter 13’s requirement of living on a strict budget for three to five years will pose a 
formidable challenge to families in unaffordable or severely unaffordable housing. Assuming 
these families do not have large increases in income in the next few years, these families will 
have fixed or escalating housing expenses that limit their flexibility in coping with unexpected 
expenses. For these families, chapter 13 repayment may represent a lengthy sentence of continued 
financial hardship. Ultimately, many of these families may just be prolonging their financial 
distress before eventually losing their homes to foreclosure.75  
Bankrupt families face steeper housing costs relative to their incomes than the general 
population of American homeowners. Figure 2 illustrates the disparity between the housing 
affordability of chapter 13 bankruptcy homeowners and that of all U.S. homeowners. The best 
available data indicate that about one in three (29.5%) of all Americans own homes that are either 
unaffordable or severely unaffordable.76 This level of unaffordable housing is itself troubling for 
those concerned with the economics of American families. 77 However, bankruptcy debtors fare 
markedly worse by comparison. Families in bankruptcy live in housing that is either unaffordable 
or severely unaffordable at more than two and a half times the rate of the general population of 
homeowners. Unaffordable housing is a common problem for American families, but for 
bankruptcy debtors, it is the norm, rather than an exception.  
The high homeownership costs of bankruptcy debtors have not been thoroughly documented 
until now.78 Bankruptcy scholarship on the subject is sparse, and real estate finance scholars have 
largely ignored the frequency with which families facing foreclosure seek bankruptcy relief.79 
Yet, the large fraction of families who enter bankruptcy with unaffordable housing costs has 
serious implications for the bankruptcy system. The widespread problem of housing 
unaffordability may jeopardize the efficiency of the chapter 13 bankruptcy system. Prior research 
has shown that only about one in three chapter 13 bankruptcy cases ends in successful plan 
                                                        
74 The median debtor in severely unaffordable housing spent $1448 on housing costs, with a median 
income of $2449. 
75 See Sarah W. Carroll & Wenli Li, The Homeownership Experience of Households in Bankruptcy 3, 
8, and tbl. 2 at 23 (Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 08-14, 2008) (reporting that 27.9% 
of Chapter 13 debtors who owned homes and filed bankruptcy between August 1, 2001 and August 1, 2002 
lost their homes to foreclosure by August 2007).  
76 See JCHS REPORT, supra note 56, at 40, tbl. A-7. 
77 As a matter of general housing policy there has long been recognition of the widespread 
unaffordability of housing, but these discussions focus only on the general population and not households 
in bankruptcy. See, e.g., K.E. Hancock, “Can Pay? Won’t Pay?” or Economic Principles of 
“Affordability”, 30 URB. STUD. 127, 128–29 (1993) (discussing problems with affordability generally 
without intimating that there may be special problems for households in insolvency proceedings). 
78 While we measure home affordability as a ratio of income to housing costs, one obvious possibility 
is that bankrupt families purchased houses that were markedly more expensive than most Americans. 
Analyzing the relative home prices of bankrupt families is beyond the scope of this paper. Such an analysis 
would be complex, taking into account the year of home purchase and most importantly the variation in 
home values, preferably at a zip code level of comparison. As a very tentative baseline, we report that the 
average home value of debtors in the Mortgage Study sample was $ $147,929. The median debtor reported 
a home value of $111,200. These figures are derived from the debtors’ bankruptcy schedules filed under 
penalty of perjury (on file with Katherine Porter). 
79 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 
325–26 (noting paucity of real estate finance scholarship that mentions bankruptcy).  
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completion and a discharge.80 A family in unaffordable housing may fail to make their ongoing 
mortgage payment, which typically results in the mortgage creditor filing a motion for relief from 
the bankruptcy stay to foreclose on the family’s home. Alternatively, families may divert money 
earmarked for a chapter 13 plan payment to meet their ongoing housing obligations. Defaulting 
on a chapter 13 repayment plan usually will lead to the bankruptcy case being dismissed. When 
this occurs, the debtor does not receive a discharge of any of their pre-bankruptcy debts. The 
bankruptcy stay is terminated when the case is dismissed, leaving the mortgage creditor free to 
proceed with foreclosure if there are any unpaid arrearages on the mortgage.81 Unaffordable 
housing costs may be an important, yet heretofore unrecognized, factor in determining a family’s 
success in completing a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.  
Families may file another bankruptcy if their initial filing did not result in a confirmed or 
completed plan. Repeat filings of bankruptcy among chapter 13 cases are fairly common. In the 
Mortgage Study sample, 30.88% of debtors reported a prior bankruptcy on their current 
bankruptcy petitions.82 As measured by the proportion of filers in each group of affordability, the 
housing cost burdens of repeat bankruptcy debtors and first-time bankruptcy debtors appear to be 
similar.83 In both groups, a majority of debtors have housing costs that require them to expend a 
high percentage of their incomes.84 
These first data on housing affordability offer a new insight into the challenges that families 
face in trying to save their homes in chapter 13 bankruptcy. Further empirical work could usefully 
explore whether a relationship exists between housing affordability and plan confirmation or plan 
completion leading to discharge. Additionally, housing affordability may correlate with whether a 
family is ultimately able to retain their house, whether they remain in chapter 13 or exit the 
bankruptcy system. The first study of homeownership outcomes of a sample of chapter 13 debtors 
in Delaware reports that a “higher monthly mortgage payment relative to income increases the 
probability of foreclosure.”85 If confirmed in a larger study, such findings would have important 
implications for measuring the effectiveness of chapter 13 bankruptcy and also for assessing how 
to structure nonbankruptcy relief that seeks to help families address unaffordable housing costs. 
                                                         
80 See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 
13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (finding an overall plan completion rate of 33%); Jean 
Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not 
Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 571 (2001) (stating the national chapter 13 plan completion rate is 
approximately 31%); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 216–17 (1989) (reporting that only one-third of chapter 13 cases ended in 
discharge).  
81 Debtors must complete all payments under the plan before a court will enter a discharge of their 
pre-bankruptcy debts. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2006). If a debtor materially defaults with respect to a term of a 
confirmed plan, such as by failing to make plan payments, a court may dismiss the chapter 13 case. 11 
U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6). 
82 Neither the date nor the chapter of the prior bankruptcy was coded as part of the Mortgage Study. 
Another study of chapter 13 cases found that over 50% of bankruptcy debtors had filed at least one prior 
bankruptcy. Norberg & Velkey, supra note 80, at 479 (studying 795 chapter 13 cases in seven judicial 
districts). 
83 A cross-tabulation did not reveal a statistically significant difference between the representation of 
repeat bankruptcy filers and first-time filers in the three categories of affordability. Pearson chi-
square=2.654. p=.265 (on file with Katherine Porter).  
84 See Mortgage Study (on file with Katherine Porter).   
85 Carroll & Li, supra note 75, at 15, tbl. 3 (finding that the ratio of monthly mortgage payment to 
income had a statistically significant effect in a regression model that attempted to measure whether 
bankruptcy cases ended in home loss from foreclosure).  
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B.  Decile Breakdown of Chapter 13 Debtors’ Housing Affordability 
 
The percentage of debtors in the three categories of housing costs—affordable, unaffordable, 
and severely unaffordable—provides a basic picture of housing affordability. A decile analysis of 
debtor housing costs in relation to income provides a more detailed picture that reveals more 
about the distribution of bankrupt families across the affordability spectrum. Figure 3 illustrates 
the percentage of chapter 13 debtors at each decile of income required to pay their housing costs.  
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Bankruptcy Debtors by Decile of Housing Affordability 
 
Three observations can be made based on this analysis of affordability. First, for the debtors 
at the lowest end of the affordability spectrum—those spending less than 10% of income on 
housing—it is unlikely the primary purpose of seeking bankruptcy protection was preventing 
foreclosure. Of these debtors, 83% had no mortgage, and the remainder had incomes far in excess 
of their housing costs.86 These families may have chosen chapter 13 repayment bankruptcy 
instead of chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy in part because they wanted to retain their homes, but 
imminent foreclosure or mortgage arrearage was unlikely the driving factor for their bankruptcy 
filings. For the one in ten debtors who spends less than 20% of household income on housing 
costs, factors other than housing affordability seem likely to be the principal determinants of 
success in addressing financial problems in bankruptcy.  
Second, at the other end of the affordability spectrum, some bankrupt families are spending 
90 to 100% of their incomes on housing.87 In this top decile, 72% of families had housing costs 
that exceeded their total incomes. At the time of their bankruptcy filings, these families did not 
have enough dollars to pay their mortgages and other housing costs, much less purchase 
                                                        
86 Mortgage Study data (on file with Katherine Porter.) 
87 Additional error checking was performed for all records reporting a housing cost to income ratio 
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subsistence goods such as food, medicine, and clothing. Homeowners filing these bankruptcy 
cases seem doomed to fail at retaining their homes through a bankruptcy repayment plan.  
Despite circumstances that appear to make a repayment plan patently impossible, there are 
several possible explanations for these debtors’ decisions to file chapter 13 bankruptcy.88 Some 
debtors may be expecting a significant increase in current income immediately after their 
bankruptcy filings. As discussed in Part II, the affordability metrics are static, measuring housing 
costs only as of the date of bankruptcy filing and using the debtor’s current actual income at the 
moment of the bankruptcy. Filing chapter 13 while spending 90% or more of one’s income on 
housing costs may be rational for a debtor whose income on the day of bankruptcy filing is an 
unemployment check but who is starting a higher paying job in a few weeks.  
The second plausible explanation for filing bankruptcy with unfeasible housing costs is that 
some families may be using bankruptcy to forestall pending foreclosures and gain time to cope 
with the eventual loss of their homes. Although there is a great deal of state-to-state variety in 
foreclosure processes, a common feature of nonjudicial foreclosure is its speed. For example, in 
Texas, as few as forty-one days can elapse between mortgage default and home sale.89 The 
rapidity of the foreclosure process may not give families enough time to make a frank assessment 
of whether they can keep their homes. Alternatively, debtors may know the loss of their homes is 
imminent, but file bankruptcy to delay that eventual outcome. In such situations, the mortgage 
company is likely to obtain relief from the bankruptcy stay and be able to proceed with 
foreclosure. However, this process can take a month or more, during which time the debtor can 
find new housing or may be able to sell the property themselves, which reduces the loss of equity 
that typically comes with a foreclosure sale.90  
Another reason that families with extremely high housing costs in relation to income may 
file chapter 13 bankruptcy is that they are unable to accept that they cannot save their homes. 
Buying a home is the largest financial investment and greatest financial risk that most people ever 
make.91 Losing a home can feel like a major personal failure and often will publicly expose the 
depth of a families’ financial problems.92 These factors, and others such as a desire to protect 
their children from changing homes and schools,93 could cause people to try to save their homes 
even when a rational analysis would show that such efforts are doomed to failure.94 The court                                                         
88 An additional reason could be a debtor’s bankruptcy attorney steering the debtor into chapter 13 
rather than chapter 7, even though the family has no plausible chance of being able to use chapter 13’s 
specialized home-saving provisions or of being able to confirm a repayment plan. Attorneys may prefer 
chapter 13 because such cases usually garner higher attorney’s fees than chapter 7 and such fees may be 
paid over time, permitting some families to enter bankruptcy that could not afford to pay the lump-sum 
filing fee required to enter chapter 7 bankruptcy.  
89 See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 2007) (allowing real property purchased under a 
deed of trust with a power of sale clause to be sold after debtor is given twenty days to cure the default on 
the obligation and the property is advertised for twenty one days). 
90 See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 796–98, 823–25 (discussing the effect of 
filing a chapter 13 bankruptcy on foreclosure proceedings).  
91 See Jacoby, supra note 79, at 324 & n.5 (citing a variety of studies to support this contention). A 
home is also most families’ largest non-financial asset. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 59, at 136.  
92 See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Take Toll on Mental Health: Crisis Hotlines, Therapists 
See a Surge in Anxiety Over Housing, USA TODAY, May 15, 2008, at A1 (telling the story of Raymond and 
Deanna Donaca, who are believed to have committed suicide after unsuccessfully attempting to prevent the 
foreclosure of their home). 
93 Eric S. Nguyen, Parents in Financial Crisis: Fighting to Keep the Family Home, 82 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 229, 237–39 (2008) (presenting findings from empirical analysis showing that parents of school-age 
children are more likely to retain their homes during a period of financial distress than non-parents).  
94 Jacoby, supra note 79, at 334 (citing research on the psychological effects of home loss).  
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record data do not reveal the extent to which these three explanations (anticipated increase in 
income, delay of foreclosure, or unwillingness to accept loss of a home) motivate bankruptcy 
filings by families whose housing costs are in the top deciles of the unaffordability distribution. 
While such families make up less than 5% of all debtors in the Mortgage Study sample, their 
presence in the chapter 13 bankruptcy system is curious given the apparent hopelessness of these 
debtors’ prospects for saving their homes.  
A third notable feature of the distribution is the number of chapter 13 debtors who 
collectively spend more than 50% of their incomes on housing costs. More than one in three of 
the families in this severely unaffordable category are spending 60% or more of their incomes on 
housing. That is, a sizeable component of the one in five debtors whose housing costs exceed 
50% is not near the demarcation between unaffordable and severely unaffordable. As the 
distribution in the upper deciles in Figure 2 shows, nearly one in ten families spend 60% or more 
of its income on housing costs.  
The hardship facing such families can be seen in an examination of the actual dollar amounts 
at issue. Among the top three deciles (families paying 70% or more of their incomes on housing), 
the average household had a monthly paycheck of $2181. The same average household in these 
top three tiers then reportedly spends $1997 of those dollars on housing costs. The funds available 
for all other expenses after paying housing costs is less than $184 per month, an insufficient 
amount to even feed a single adult in America. The situation of the typical (median) household in 
the top three deciles of housing affordability is similarly bleak. This household has a monthly 
paycheck of $1887 and spends $1723 on housing costs. The depth of the plight of families in 
severely unaffordable housing and the small but steady distribution of families along the top half 
of the affordability spectrum suggest that many families may stand little chance of saving their 
homes under the current bankruptcy system that does not permit the adjustment of ongoing 
mortgage obligations. 
 
C.  Regional Breakdown of Chapter 13 Debtors’ Housing Affordability 
 
Across the United States, there is considerable variation in both the number of chapter 13 
cases each year and the characteristics of the chapter 13 debtors.95 The housing affordability of 
homeowners that file bankruptcy also varies. A regional analysis of the differences in 
affordability shows that some pockets of the bankruptcy system have particularly large numbers 
of debtors with unaffordable housing costs.  
The Mortgage Study gathered data from bankruptcy cases filed in twenty-four states.96 To 
analyze the geographic differences in housing affordability, the regional divisions of the U.S. 
                                                        
95 See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 501, 580–82 (1993) (documenting variation in chapter 13 bankruptcy practice). 
96 Table 1 reports the percentage of cases in each region. Two factors explain the disparity in the 
number of cases per region. One, only non-judicial foreclosure states were selected, as explained in Part III, 
supra. Historical legal developments have resulted in many southern states having non-judicial foreclosure 
schemes, in part explaining the large percentage of southern states represented in the Study. See generally 
NELSON &WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 665 n.1 (listing the states that have adopted non-judicial foreclosure 
schemes). The other reason there is variation in the number of cases per region is the sample was weighted 
so districts with more chapter 13 cases had more cases in the sample. As noted in Part II, supra, there are 
large district-to-district variations in the number of chapter 13 cases filed and in the fraction of all 
bankruptcy filings that are made in chapter 13 rather than chapter 7.  
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Census Bureau were used to categorize each state in the sample.97 Figure 4 shows the percentage 
of chapter 13 debtors with affordable, unaffordable, and severely affordable housing costs in each 
census region. 
 
Figure 4: Housing Affordability of Bankruptcy Debtors by Geographic Region 
Bankrupt families who live on either coast are much more likely to live in severely 
unaffordable housing than their counterparts in the middle of the country. Nearly half of the 
debtors in the study who reside in the New England or Pacific region (consisting of families in 
California)98 enter bankruptcy with housing costs that exceed 50% of their incomes. The large 
number of families in severely unaffordable housing in these areas illustrates the affordability                                                                                                                                                                      
Table 1: Percentage of Cases in Mortgage Study Sample by U.S. Census Region 
Region  Cases per Region 
New England  2.57% 
Midwest: East North Central 8.76% 
Midwest: West North Central 5.78% 
South Atlantic 30.71% 
East South Central 24.75% 




No cases were sampled from the Middle Atlantic Division, consisting of New York, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania because these states require judicial foreclosure of residential mortgages, and the Mortgage 
Study drew its sample only from states that require judicial foreclosure of mortgages of a borrower’s 
principal residence.  
97 See generally U.S. Census Bureau, Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, available at 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
98 The other states in the Pacific region (Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington) were excluded 
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(n=1713) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1349151
22 
 
problem facing thousands of bankrupt families. These two regions have large populations and 
constitute a significant portion of all chapter 13 cases each year. Adding to the unaffordability 
problems in the New England and Pacific regions is the extremely low percentage of debtors in 
affordable housing. Fewer than one in ten families in New England files bankruptcy with housing 
costs that consume below 30% of their incomes. In the Pacific region, the ratio is less than two in 
ten families. In these jurisdictions, the vast majority of debtors will devote more than 30% of their 
incomes to pay ongoing housing costs, leaving very few dollars to use for current expenses, to 
repay unsecured creditors or to cure mortgage arrearages.  
In contrast, families in the South appear to have much better prospects for saving their 
homes. Severely unaffordable housing is less common, and affordable housing is more common. 
The part of the country with the best affordability characteristics is the South: West South Central 
region,99 where fully 40% of chapter 13 families spend 30% or less of their incomes on housing. 
These debtors may be better off than their coastal counterparts in trying to save their homes. 
However, even this group of bankruptcy debtors still faces much sharper housing costs relative to 
their incomes than the American population in general.100 
While scholars have noted variation in chapter 13 plan completion rates among judicial 
districts and states,101 none has considered how differences in housing affordability may explain 
such disparities. Additional empirical research could attempt to gauge the presence of such effects 
and determine if differences that were previously attributed to “local legal culture”102 are at least 
to some degree driven by variation in housing affordability. Moderate housing costs give families 
more flexibility in their budgets to meet unexpected expenses or cope with drops in income. With 
less of their earnings committed to a mortgage and other nondiscretionary costs of 
homeownership such as utilities, these families may appear to have a reasonable chance at 
completing a chapter 13 plan and earning a discharge in bankruptcy.  
Attorneys, trustees, and judges may share the sense, even if unarticulated hereto, that 
housing costs are an important factor in the viability of chapter 13 bankruptcy cases and may be 
more likely to promote chapter 13 bankruptcy as a viable option to halt foreclosure and save 
homes in parts of the country, such as the South, where housing affordability is less of a problem. 
Even if plan completion rates do not relate to housing affordability, more families may be 
attracted to chapter 13 and may file bankruptcy in an attempt to save their homes (even if 
ultimately such an attempt is unsuccessful) if their housing costs subsume less of their incomes. 
That is, debtors outside the New England and Pacific regions may believe that they stand a better 
chance of saving their homes in bankruptcy even if no such effect exists.  
 
D.  Residual Income Analysis 
 
As the findings in the prior sections illustrate, unaffordable housing is a widespread problem 
in bankruptcy. Both across the country and across the distribution of bankruptcy debtors, many 
families are trying to save homes despite being saddled with housing costs that are unaffordable 
or severely unaffordable under the HUD standards. In this section of the Article, we use an                                                         
99 In the Mortgage Study sample, the states in this region are Arkansas and Texas.  
100 See supra fig.2.  
101 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
102 See Braucher, supra note 95, at 580–82 (studying local legal culture and examining district-by-
district variations in the attitudes and expectations of the repeat players in the bankruptcy system—judges, 
trustees, lawyers, and creditors); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence From the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 804–05 (1994) (documenting persistence of inter-district variations within 
states).  
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alternate standard of housing affordability, residual income, to examine the hardships imposed by 
high housing costs. As explained in Part II, supra,103 residual income measures the absolute 
dollars that a family has remaining to spend on all other expenses after paying its housing costs. 
The residual income figures used in this Article are the HHS federal poverty guidelines less a 
30% allowance for housing.104 For example, under the HHS guidelines, a family of four was 
deemed to be living in poverty if its monthly income was less than $1667.105 If a family spent 
30% of that income on housing, it would have approximately $1166 remaining as residual income 
for other expenses. The federal government considers an income that exceeds that level to be 
necessary to avoid living in poverty.106 
To analyze how many families had housing costs that left them with poverty-level incomes, 
we compared each family’s income at the time of its bankruptcy filing, less its actual housing 
costs, with the HHS poverty benchmarks adjusted to permit a 30% housing expenditure. This 
measure reveals how many bankrupt families have residual incomes after housing costs that leave 
them with a poverty-level income to spend on non-housing expenses.  
Because the HHS poverty threshold is very low, most bankrupt families had enough residual 
income to prevent them from being classified as living in housing-induced poverty. While much 
lower than the average for the American population, the incomes of most bankrupt families still 
exceed the poverty level. Only a small fraction (3.68%) of the families in chapter 13 bankruptcy 
could not afford the poverty-line level of goods and services because their incomes at the time of 
their bankruptcy filings were already below the poverty line.107 A larger percentage of bankrupt 
homeowners failed to earn enough to meet the residual income standard. Approximately 8% 
(7.94%) of families in bankruptcy had incomes above the poverty line, but after paying housing 
costs, did not have sufficient remaining income to purchase the poverty-level basket of non-
housing goods and services. These families’ housing costs left them with a poverty or below-
poverty subsistence lifestyle. In total, nearly one in eight (11.62%) bankrupt families did not have 
enough income or residual income at the time of their bankruptcies to avoid poverty.  
While only a minority of bankrupt families suffer housing-induced poverty, its presence 
among chapter 13 debtors is testament to the strength of families’ motivation to save their homes.                                                         
103 See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.  
104 Table 2 shows the annual and monthly income guidelines for the HHS poverty standards and the 
adjustments made to those standards to allow for housing costs that subsume 30% of income.  
 
Table 2: Residual Income Criteria Using HHS Poverty Guidelines 
Family 
Size 
Annual Income HHS 2006 
Poverty Guidelines 
Monthly Income HHS 
2006 Poverty Guidelines 
Monthly Poverty Threshold 
Residual Income 
(HHS minus 30%) 
1 $9,800.00 $816.67 $571.67 
2 $13,200.00 $1,100.00 $770.00 
3 $16,600.00 $1,383.33 $968.33 
4 $20,000.00 $1,666.67 $1,166.67 
5 $23,400.00 $1,950.00 $1,365.00 
6 $26,800.00 $2,233.33 $1,563.33 
7 $30,200.00 $2,516.67 $1,761.67 
8 $33,600.00 $2,800.00 $1,960.00 
 
105 See supra note 104104.  
106 Id. 
107 Only 0.41% of families whose income put them below the poverty line had enough left after 
housing costs to afford more than the poverty-line level of goods and services. 
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These families are willing to suffer poverty to make a last effort to hang on to their homes. These 
families’ bankruptcies reflect their hope that bankruptcy can help them succeed at 
homeownership despite housing costs that overwhelm their incomes.  
 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
The Mortgage Study data highlight the heavy burdens that families face in trying to save 
their homes in bankruptcy. More than 70% of bankrupt homeowners have housing costs that are 
unaffordable or severely unaffordable on their incomes. However, current bankruptcy law does 
not permit families to modify the terms of their home mortgages. To succeed in bankruptcy and 
save their homes from foreclosure, these families must achieve the difficult task of trying to 
stretch their incomes both to cure their mortgage arrearages and to make regular mortgage 
payments. Because the law does not permit courts to address ongoing problems with housing 
affordability, the anti-modification rule for home mortgages undermines bankruptcy’s potential as 
a home-saving tool. Particularly for today’s families, many of whom have adjustable-rate 
mortgages or other nontraditional loan products, bankruptcy may be an incomplete or inadequate 
solution to their home affordability problems. To help families sustain their attempt at 
homeownership and to reduce the harms of the foreclosure crisis, bankruptcy law should be 
amended to permit courts to modify the terms of the home mortgages of chapter 13 debtors to 
adjust housing costs to affordable levels. This section examines the antimodification rule in the 
context of the modern mortgage market and outlines the recent legislation introduced in Congress 
to empower bankruptcy courts to modify the terms of home mortgages. The section concludes by 
summarizing the procedural and administrative benefits of using the bankruptcy system to 
address the housing affordability problem that is a central feature of the foreclosure crisis.  
 
A.  The Antimodification Rule in Historical and Current Contexts 
 
The Bankruptcy Code’s anti-modification rule prohibits the modification of claims secured 
by real property that is the debtor’s principal residence. 108 The rule has its origins in the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,109 which created the current Bankruptcy Code.110 Under 
bankruptcy law prior to the 1978 Code, chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a repayment 
plan could not be approved unless every secured creditor that would receive payments in the plan 
consented to it.111 Additionally, debtors under chapter XIII had no ability to address debts secured 
by their home residences because the term “claim” expressly excluded “claims secured by estates 
in real property or chattel real.”112 These limitations made bankruptcy relief of limited or no use 
for debtors who needed to deal with defaults on loans to mortgage creditors.  
In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to improve the ability of bankruptcy 
debtors to repay their mortgage creditors and save their homes from foreclosures.113 The new 
chapter 13 bankruptcy system was designed to provide individuals with the opportunity to repay 
                                                        
108 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006). 
109 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
110 The Bankruptcy Code has been amended several times since its enactment in 1978, most recently 
by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). Nevertheless, the Code’s overall 
structure remains very similar to the statute as enacted in 1978. 
111 See Bankruptcy Act §§ 651–52, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051–52 (1976).  
112 See Bankruptcy Act § 606, 11 U.S.C. § 1006(1) (repealed in 1979).  
113 See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2006). 
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debts, in full or in part, while retaining assets.114 An innovation of chapter 13 was enabling the 
debtor to cure defaults on secured claims through the repayment of loan arrearages over time, 
even if the terms of the loan or nonbankruptcy law did not give the borrower this right.115 The 
new chapter 13 also permitted debtors to modify the rights of holders of secured or unsecured 
claims.116 This provision allowed bankruptcy courts to approve repayment plans that changed the 
prebankruptcy terms of a debt. However, the law contained an important exception to this 
modification rule for claims “secured only by a security interest in real property that is the 
debtor’s principal residence . . . .”117 This antimodification rule has endured as a feature of 
chapter 13 for three decades.  
During the current foreclosure crisis, Congress has considered several proposals to eliminate 
the antimodification rule.118 Proponents of such change assert that the existing law is a barrier to 
effective bankruptcy relief for homeowners that face foreclosure.119 To evaluate the merits of 
such a change, the antimodification rule should be examined in its historical context. This 
background highlights the significant changes in the modern mortgage market and the 
circumstances of the current foreclosure crisis that may undermine the traditional justification for 
the rule.  
The legislative history with respect to the antimodification rule is sparse. Section 1322(b)(2) 
as enacted in 1978 appears to have been a compromise between competing versions of 
legislation. The Senate bill provided that debtors’ plans could “modify the rights of holders of 
secured claims and holders of unsecured claims, except claims wholly secured by real estate 
mortgages . . . .” 120 The House version of § 1322(b)(2) took a broader approach and simply stated 
that the debtors’ plan of reorganization could “modify the rights of holders of secured claims or 
of holders of unsecured claims.”121 Secured creditors objected strenuously to these changes. In 
particular, advocates for secured creditors argued that debtors should not be able to modify 
secured claims by reducing the monthly payment or by reducing the amount of the claim to the 
value of the collateral.122 Creditors also suggested that a right to modification would discourage 
                                                        
114 See S. REP. NO. 95-989 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5927 (“Chapter 13 is 
designed to serve as a flexible vehicle for the repayment of part or all of the allowed claims of the 
debtor.”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6079 (“The benefit to the 
debtor of developing a plan of repayment under chapter 13, rather than opting for liquidation under chapter 
7, is that it permits the debtor to protect his assets.”). 
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). 
116 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).  
117 Id.  
118 See, e.g., Homeowner Assistance and Taxpayer Protection Act, S. 3690, 110th Cong. § 103 (2008); 
Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007); 
Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. § 4 
(2007); Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, S. 2636, 110th Cong. § 101 (2008); HOMES Act, S. 2133, 
110th Cong. § 2 (2007); HOMES Act, H.R. 3778, 110th Cong. § 202 (2007).  
119 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, HR 3609—COMPROMISE BILL PERMITTING COURT-SUPERVISED 
LOAN MODIFICATIONS WOULD SAVE 600,000 HOMES 1 (2008), available at  
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/hr-3609-support-brief.pdf. 
120 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 141 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5927.  
121 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 429 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6384.  
122 See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav., 730 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, Pt.1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements of the Judicial Machinery of the S. 
Comm. on Judiciary, 94th Cong. 124, 127–28, 130, 132–34, 137–38, 139, 141–42, 167–68, 176–80 (1975) 
(statements of Walter Vaughan on behalf of the American Bankers Association, and of Alvin Wiese, 
National Consumer Finance Association). 
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savings and loan associations from making home loans.123 While it is impossible to pinpoint the 
exact reason why Congress excluded debtors’ principal residences from the new rule that 
permitted the modification of claims, the solvency of the savings and loan industry probably was 
a pressing concern for Congress at the time that it was considering the adoption of the new 
Bankruptcy Code.  
During the 1970s, savings and loan institutions dominated the residential mortgage market in 
the United States.124 The secondary mortgage market, in which loans were originated and then 
sold, was in its nascence. The typical late 1970s home mortgage loan was a thirty-year mortgage 
with a fixed interest rate and equal monthly payments.125 While bankruptcy reform was being 
debated in Congress, the savings and loan industry was being squeezed by a mismatch of high 
short-term interest rates paid on deposits and lower fixed interest rates and level payments being 
paid on residential mortgage loans.126 Because the savings and loan institutions funded mortgage 
loans from federally-insured deposits, trouble for the industry created large potential liability for 
the federal government.127 Congress may have created an exception for home mortgage loans 
from modification in chapter 13 bankruptcy as a concession to the financial challenges facing 
savings and loan institutions. The special treatment of home mortgages certainly reflects a 
political compromise, as well as the broader financial context, of the time in which chapter 13 
was created.  
However, the days in which the savings and loan industry dominated the residential 
mortgage market in the United States have long past.128 Efforts to protect the savings and loan 
industry and expand the availability of credit in the late 1970s were replaced by concerns about 
the growth of abusive lending practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s.129 During this period, 
home mortgage lending was profoundly transformed. The secondary mortgage market expanded 
                                                        
123 See id. at 245 n.13 (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements of the Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 652–53, 703, 707, 
714–15, 719–21 (1977) (statements of Alvin Wiese and John V. Kulik, National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts) (discouraging savings and loan associations from making home loans).  
124 See Douglas B. Diamond, Jr. & Michael J. Lea, Housing Finance in Developed Countries: An 
International Comparison of Efficiency: United States, 3 J. OF HOUSING RES. 145, 145 (1990). 
125 See id. (explaining that deregulation of lending practices in the late 1970s and early 1980s gave 
rise to adjustable rate mortgages).   
126 See id.; see also Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical 
and International Context, 19 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 93, 98 (2005). Fixed-rate mortgages paid between five 
and six percent while yield on short term Treasury bills generally did not exceed four percent. See id. at 97. 
The year before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the yield rate on three-month Treasury bills had begun a 
steady climb from a 4–6% range in 1977 to 6–9% in 1978 and into double digit figures to reach an 
annualized high of over 14% in 1981. See Fed. Reserve, Statistical Release H15, 3-Month Auction High 
Bill Rate by Issue Date (June 30, 2000),  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data/Annual/discontinued_AH_M3.txt. 
127 Barbara Randolph, Special Report: The Savings and Loan Crisis, TIME, Feb. 20, 1989, at 68 
(estimating cost of bailing out struggling savings and loan institutions at $10 billion in 1983).  
128 See CYNTHIA ANGELL & CLARE D. ROWLEY, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC, BREAKING NEW 
GROUND IN U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING, (2006),  
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20062q/na/2006_summer04.html (describing decline in 
savings and loan mortgage originations after regulatory reform).  
129 For example, in 1994 Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), 
which created a special class of high cost home mortgages. Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 152(a)–(c), 154(a), 108 
Stat. 2190, 2191, 2196 (1994). For this class of home loans, HOEPA banned certain practices such as 
balloon payments, negative amortization, and default interest rates. See id. § 152(d).    
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exponentially, and the securitization of residential mortgage loans became common.130 Non-
depository mortgage lenders, such as finance companies, became the primary originators of 
residential mortgage loans, and the subprime market that made mortgage loans on less robust 
underwriting standards began to flourish.131  
Early subprime loans, often fixed-rate, were characterized by high interest rates and high 
points and fees at origination.132 For example, in 1999 subprime mortgage loans had interest rates 
as high as 19.99%, with a median interest rate between 11% and 11.99%. By contrast, for the 
same year the interest rate for conventional prime thirty-year mortgages was 7.43%.133 The higher 
interest rates on subprime loans translated into higher monthly mortgage payments for loans of 
identical amounts. These higher monthly payments increased the incidence of unaffordable 
housing costs while concomitantly expanding the homeownership markets to lower income 
families, many of whom had fewer assets and weaker credit histories than traditional 
homeowners.  
Loan-to-value ratios for mortgages also increased during the 1990s as lenders aggressively 
marketed home equity loans and debt consolidation programs in which the debt on the home 
exceeded the value of the property.134 Lenders knowingly allowed borrowers to leverage their 
homes beyond the current market value of those homes.135 Rather than relying on equity in the 
collateral, lenders counted on borrowers’ abilities to refinance as home prices appreciated and 
borrowers’ fear of foreclosure to protect their interests.136 These high loan-to-value lenders also 
“turned away from traditional mortgage lending standards in favor of underwriting standards 
similar to those used for unsecured (primarily, credit card) loan products.”137 Despite looser 
underwriting standards and subprime loan products that put families in home loans that greatly 
exceeded affordability criteria, lenders nevertheless had some modicum of protection from loss 
because bankruptcy’s antimodification rule limited the attractiveness and scope of chapter 13                                                         
130 In 1994, approximately $10 billion worth of home equity loans were securitized. DANIEL 
IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, TWO STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET PREDATORY LENDING, 
AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE 12 (1999). In 2003, 
securitization in the subprime market had mushroomed to $203 billion. Derrick M. Land, Residential 
Mortgage Securitization and Consumer Welfare, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 208, 217 (2007); see also 
Lei Ding, Janneke Ratcliffe, Michael A. Stegman & Roberto G. Quercia, Neighborhood Patterns of High-
Cost Lending: The Case of Atlanta, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 193, 194 (2008) (reporting 
that growth in subprime securitization increased over forty-four-fold between 1994 and 2006, from $11 
billion to more than $483 billion). 
131 See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional 
Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 527–28 
(2000).  
132 See id. at 536–37 (providing data on interest rate range for subprime loans).  
133 See id.  
134 In 1998 the Office of Thrift Supervision issued a warning to lenders about the risks of high-loan to 
value ratios. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THRIFT BULLETIN TB 72 at 1-3 
(1998) (“An increasing number of lenders are aggressively marketing home equity and debt consolidation 
loans, where the loans, combined with any senior mortgages, are near or exceed the value of the security 
property. . . . Until recently, the high LTV [loan to value] home mortgage market was dominated by 
mortgage brokers and other less regulated lenders. Consumer groups and some members of Congress have 
expressed concern over the growth of these loans, and the mass marketing tactics used by some lenders.”). 
135 See id.   
136 See CHARLES CALOMIRIS & JOSEPH MASON, HIGH LOAN-TO-VALUE MORTGAGE LENDING: 
PROBLEM OR CURE? 11 (1999), available at http://www.aei.org/doclib/20021130_71252.pdf; Posting of 
Elizabeth Warren to Credit Slips: A Discussion on Credit and Bankruptcy,  
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/11/hostage-value.html (Nov. 21, 2007, 16:54).  
137 CALOMIRIS & MASON, supra note 136, at 11. 
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relief for homeowners in financial distress. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, 
lenders primarily escaped foreclosure because of borrowers’ ability to refinance as home prices 
appreciated and because of strong demand for mortgage-backed securities that expanded 
underwriting standards. While Chapter 13 bankruptcy could do little to help homeowners during 
the early 2000s, the market largely provided a safety valve for families in unaffordable loans.  
The more recent advent of “exotic” or “non-traditional” subprime loan products has 
exacerbated the extent to which the antimodification rule hampers bankruptcy’s effectiveness as a 
home-saving tool. Many of these new mortgage products become severely unaffordable within a 
few years of origination by virtue of changing terms. The most dominant non-traditional 
mortgage product is the adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM). The most common product, the 2/28 
ARM, is characterized by a fixed rate for the first two years, followed by an adjustment every six 
months thereafter. Often these loans are structured with an initial “teaser” or discounted rate. 
After the two-year fixed period for these loans expires, the interest rate, and accordingly the 
borrower’s payments, can increase significantly.138 To determine whether the borrower had the 
ability to make payments on the 2/28 ARM loan, lenders typically considered only whether the 
monthly payment based on the teaser rate would be affordable.139 The expiration of the fixed-rate 
period brings with it a sharp increase in monthly payment, often referred to as “payment 
shock.”140 By mid-2006, hybrid ARMs such as 2/28s or 3/27s, made up 81% of the securitized 
subprime market.141  
Similarly, borrowers with option ARM loans are also subject to payment shock. With an 
option ARM, borrowers have the “option” of making a minimum payment, an interest-only 
payment, or a fully amortized payment. For most borrowers who took out such loans, the 
minimum payment is the only affordable payment on their incomes. However, this payment is 
insufficient to cover accrued interest on the loan, which results in any unpaid interest being added 
to the principal balance. As a result, the loan balance increases with time (i.e., negatively 
amortizes). Despite making payments over a period of months or years, the homeowner will find 
herself owing an increasing amount of mortgage debt, rather than building equity. Almost all 
option ARMs have trigger points that cause the loans to recast so that they will fully amortize 
over the remaining duration of the loan terms. Most option ARMs will recast five years from 
origination (a time trigger) or if the loan balance exceeds 110% of the original loan amount (a 
loan balance trigger.)142 Like the expiration of the teaser rate on a 2/28 ARM, the recasting of an 
option ARM leads to a very large increase in the monthly payment amount for most borrowers. 
Additionally, weaker underwriting standards have led to the rapid growth of no 
documentation or low documentation loans that require no or limited verification of ability to                                                         
138 Typically, there is a cap on the increase in the first adjustment of 2% and caps on subsequent 
adjustments of 1%. 
139 Beverlea (Suzy) Gardner & Dennis C. Ankenbrand, Hybrid ARMs: Assessing the Risks, Managing 
the Fallout, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2008, at 14, 17, available at  
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum08/sisum08.pdf  
(listing underwriting weakness with hybrid ARM originations from 2004 until 2007, including qualifying 
buyers based on introductory payment); Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 
(July 10, 2007) (“The Agencies are concerned that many subprime borrowers may not have sufficient 
financial capacity to service a higher debt load, especially if they were qualified based on a low 
introductory payment.”).  
140 Gardner & Ankenbrand, supra note 139, at 17. 
141 DERIVATIVE FITCH, STRUCTURED FINANCE: U.S. SUBPRIME RMBS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE 
CDOS 2 (2006). 
142 If the borrower makes only minimum payments every month, the loan balance trigger will usually 
be reached before the time trigger. 
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repay the loan.143 As a result of these changes in the modern mortgage market, traditional tools 
for preventing foreclosures such as nonbankruptcy forbearance agreements or chapter 13 
bankruptcy repayment plans are much less effective than in the past. The bankruptcy right to 
repay mortgage arrearages over time does not address the ongoing increase in mortgage payments 
that millions of homeowners face with the nontraditional loan products originated in the last 
decade.  
The antimodification rule enacted in 1978, at least in part to protect the savings and loan 
industry, has not been amended in thirty years, despite these vast changes in the residential 
mortgage market. The dramatic growth of high interest rate loans and nontraditional loan 
products has translated into far more unaffordable home loans. Particularly as the new products 
age, the changes in these loan terms have created sharp upticks in mortgage payments that cannot 
be met by families whose incomes rarely have experienced similar, dramatic increases. 
Unaffordable housing costs are a widespread feature of today’s American homeownership 
experience and are the driving factor of the foreclosure crisis. Absent the ability to address 
exploding interest rates, negatively amortizing loans, and over-leveraged homes, bankruptcy will 
be an incomplete or inadequate solution to the current problem of homeownership affordability.  
 
B.  Proposals to Permit Modifying Home Mortgages in Bankruptcy 
 
In the wake of rapidly rising foreclosure rates in late 2007, policymakers struggled to 
formulate solutions. A popular proposal was to repeal the antimodification provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code to improve bankruptcy relief as a means to help families struggling with 
unaffordable home loans. Current law was criticized as a major roadblock to keeping families in 
their homes. Several bills were introduced in Congress to allow bankruptcy courts to modify the 
terms of chapter 13 debtors’ residential mortgage loans.144 Consumer advocates backed the 
legislation, citing a continued escalation in the number of foreclosures and describing the harms 
that families and communities suffer from foreclosure.145 The lending industry mounted a strong 
and continuous opposition to the bills, relying mainly on their predictions that the modification of 
home mortgages in bankruptcy would cause mortgage rates to rise 1.5% to 2% on future loans.146 
The industry’s figures were heavily criticized for being unsupported by empirical analysis,147 but 
the industry generated enough concern over mortgage market liquidity that, as of November 
2008, none of the bills has garnered sufficient support to succeed in the Senate or the House of                                                         
143 By 2006 no or low documentation loans made up 49% of mortgage loans originated in the United 
States. See CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR: UNDERESTIMATED NO MORE 38 (2007), 
available at http://billcara.com/CS%20Mar%2012%202007%20Mortgage%20and%20Housing.pdf. .  
144 See supra note 118.  
145 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, H.R. 3609: COMPROMISE BILL PERMITTING COURT-SUPERVISED 
LOAN MODIFICATIONS WOULD SAVE 600,000 HOMES (2008), available at  
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/hr-3609-support-brief.pdf. 
146 Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess: How Can We Protect Home Ownership and Provide Relief 
to Consumers in Financial Distress?—Part II: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. at 3. (2007) [hereinafter Kittle 
Testimony] (statement of David Kittle, Mortgage Bankers Association), available at 
 http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/StoptheBankruptcyCramDown/StatementofDavidKittle.pdf;  
see Mortgage Bankers Association, Press Release, “Stop the Cram Down Resource Center” Puts a Price 
Tag on Bankruptcy Reform, Jan. 15, 2007, available at  
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/59343.htm.  
147 Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down on Mortgage Markets 
(Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1087816, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087816. 
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Representatives. Notwithstanding concerns about political feasibility, an examination of the 
proposals to eliminate the antimodification rule illustrates how changing bankruptcy law could 
help families in unaffordable home loans save their homes and could reduce the incidence of 
foreclosure.  
 
1.  Interest Rate Freezes or Reductions 
 
Each of the proposed bills to permit the modification of mortgage loans in bankruptcy would 
provide, to some extent, for freezes or reductions of interest rates on mortgage loans. For 
example, S. 2136 would allow for payment of the mortgage at a “fixed annual percentage rate,” 
even if the actual terms of the promissory note obligate the borrower to pay under an adjustable 
rate.148 A bankruptcy court would have the authority to recalibrate the interest rate to be “equal to 
the most recently published annual yield on conventional mortgages published by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . . plus a reasonable premium for risk.”149 If enacted 
into law, this provision would permit a homeowner to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case as a tool 
to stop adjustments on an exploding ARM, convert an ARM into a fixed-rate loan, or reduce the 
interest rate on a high-cost subprime loan.  
The beneficial effect of the ability to modify interest rates is illustrated by reexamining the 
situation of the Minnesota family in the Mortgage Study that filed bankruptcy.150 Recall that the 
family had an adjustable-rate mortgage with an initial teaser interest rate of 7.99% and a monthly 
payment of $1781.151 However, after the first two years of the loan the interest rate began to 
quickly adjust upward so that within seven months the interest rate had reached 10.99% and the 
payment had climbed to $2780.152 If the interest rate freeze or reduction provision had been 
available when this family filed bankruptcy in April 2006, the debtors’ chapter 13 plan could 
have fixed the interest on their mortgage at 6.51%153 plus a premium for risk of an additional 1 to 
2%.154 The resulting postmodification interest rate range of 7.51% to 8.51% would be very close 
to the initial rate on the loan of 7.99%, allowing this family to continue with the affordable 
payment that it had managed to pay before the initial rate adjusted. Given the prevalence of ARM 
loans and high-rate subprime fixed loans among the loans currently in foreclosure,155 the ability to 
adjust or freeze an interest rate likely would give hundreds of thousands of families a fighting 
chance to prevent foreclosure and save their homes.  
                                                         
148 S. 2136, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007). 
149 S. 2136, 110th Cong. § 101(a)(3) (2007); see also S. 2636, 110th Cong. § 412 (2008); H.R. 3609, 
110th Cong. § 4 (2007); cf. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (establishing interest rate for 
secured claims subject to modification, i.e., those not secured by a debtor’s principal residence, at prime 
rate plus premium for risk). 
150 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.    
151 See id.    
152 See id.    
153 See Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15—Historical Data,  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).  
154 Although the starting point for an interest rate that uses conventional mortgage rates as a base 
would be different than for other secured claims, which use the prime rate as a base, a bankruptcy court 
could be expected to apply the same set of factors delineated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 478–79 (2004), for modifying non-mortgage claims in determining the 
appropriate risk premium for mortgage loans. According to the Supreme Court, the risk factors include “the 
circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization 
plan.” Id. at 479. 
155 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 25, at 1–3.  
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2.  Reduction of Principal Amount (Strip Down) 
 
“Stripping down” or bifurcating a secured creditor’s claim means to divide the claim into 
two parts: the secured portion, which is equal to the value of the collateral, and the unsecured 
portion, which is any amount of the debt that exceeds the value of the collateral.156 This process 
has the effect of writing down the principal balance on a loan that is secured by the mortgage to 
the value of the property as of the time of the bankruptcy. Section 506(a), which authorizes such 
bifurcation, provides that a creditor’s claim “is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.” The interaction between § 506(a) and 
the antimodification rule of § 1322(b)(2) was once the subject of much debate. The Circuit Courts 
of Appeals were divided on whether mortgage claims could be stripped down.157 In Nobleman v. 
American Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that the antimodification rule prohibited the 
strip down of claims secured by mortgages on the debtor’s principal residence. 158   
Each of the proposed bills would have changed the strip down rules in certain circumstances. 
A chapter 13 debtor could reduce the amount of outstanding principal on the mortgage to the 
value of the collateral at the time of the bankruptcy. The secured claim would be based on this 
new lower amount, reducing the payments that a family would have to make to retain its home. A 
Mortgage Study case from Texas illustrates how strip down would improve home affordability.159 
In this case, the mortgage creditor filed a claim asserting that it was owed $162,270 in total debt. 
Its proof of claim accepted the debtor’s valuation of the market value of the property as $120,200. 
Assuming this is an accurate valuation, if the claim were subject to strip down, the secured 
portion of the claim would be limited to $120,200, the value of the home. The remaining debt of 
approximately $42,000 would become additional unsecured debt owed by the bankruptcy debtor. 
For the unsecured portion of its claim, the mortgage company would receive a pro rata 
distribution of the debtor’s payments of his disposable income. The mortgage payment necessary 
to retain the property would be recalculated based on a principal amount of $120,200, which 
would be less than the amount of the note’s principal at origination, which was $125,115. The 
effect of the strip down would be to reduce the ongoing monthly mortgage payment and improve 
the debtor’s chances of keeping the house by making the mortgage payments more affordable.  
 
3.  Reamortization of Loan Term 
 
Under current law, a secured claim that is subject to strip down must be paid in full within 
the three- to five-year duration of a chapter 13 plan.160 While this feat often can be accomplished 
for claims secured by personal property, few debtors are able to pay the entire amount of their 
mortgages in that short time period. The proposed bills to repeal the antimodification rule all 
would permit a bankruptcy court to authorize payments on a home mortgage to be reamortized 
over a period extending beyond the three- to five-year term of the chapter 13 plan.161 By 
combining an extension of the loan term with an interest rate adjustment or a reduction in 
                                                        
156 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). 
157 See Bellamy v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth 
Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).  
158 508 U.S. 324 (1993).  
159 This example is from Mortgage Study case ND TX 43 (on file with Katherine Porter).  
160 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).  
161 See supra note 118.   
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principal, many families would be able to cure their arrearages in chapter 13 bankruptcy and 
avoid foreclosure.  
For example, the previously-discussed debtor162 from the Mortgage Study with a monthly 
payment nearly equal to her gross monthly income could have used the reamortization and 
interest rate reduction provisions to create a more affordable, fully amortizing loan. This debtor 
faced a severely unaffordable monthly mortgage payment even after contributions from a family 
member. The debtor’s original loan had an interest rate of 11% and was a six-year balloon note. 
Under most bills that would permit the modification of mortgage loans in bankruptcy, the debtor 
could have reduced the interest rate to 6.51% plus a risk premium and reamortized the loan over a 
thirty-year period, reduced by the period the loan had been outstanding. Because the loan was 
originated in September 2005, just seven months before the bankruptcy filing, the new loan term 
could have been up to twenty-nine years. With a principal balance on the loan of $269,000 at the 
time of the bankruptcy, the adjusted monthly payment amount for that twenty-nine-year term 
would have been approximately $1,900 after reamortization.163 While this payment would still be 
severely unaffordable by HUD standards because it would require the debtor and her household 
to spend 51% of their combined gross income on the mortgage payment, the reduction is dramatic 
from the prior situation, in which the family spent more than 60% of its income. Importantly, the 
modification would also put the debtor on the path to true homeownership because it would make 
the loan fully amortize. Rather than relying on precarious housing markets to build any equity 
while the debtor made only interest payments, the debtor could commit fewer dollars and 
improve her chances of achieving sustainable homeownership.  
 
C.  Benefits of Bankruptcy as a Foreclosure Prevention System 
 
The affordability data offer support for the substantive benefits of permitting bankruptcy 
courts to modify the terms of mortgage loans of chapter 13 debtors. Amending bankruptcy law to 
improve its efficacy to help families save their homes is also a superior policy response because it 
would be an administratively and procedurally efficient solution to the foreclosure crisis. 
Compared to the existing and proposed schemes of foreclosure aid, a bankruptcy-based solution 
to the problem of housing unaffordability offers the greatest potential of immediate and lasting 
relief to homeowners that are committed to saving their homes. This section articulates four 
procedural benefits of allowing bankruptcy courts to modify home mortgages that complement 
the substantive benefit of addressing the unaffordability problem that threatens families’ 
homeownership.  
The first benefit of permitting bankruptcy-based mortgage loan modifications is that the 
bankruptcy system already contains screening mechanisms to ensure that only needy families are 
helped. Any proposal for relief will help only some subset of Americans with mortgages. 
Requiring a bankruptcy filing to receive a loan modification would subject families to the built-in 
checks in existing bankruptcy law to gauge their need for relief. In 2005, Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code to require that consumers pass a “means test,” a stringent mechanical standard 
to ensure that consumers pay their debts if they can afford to do so.164 “Good faith” on the part of 
a debtor is also an explicit statutory requirement for chapter 13 bankruptcy relief,165 and an 
experienced cadre of bankruptcy judges is already familiar with this standard. Because all                                                         
162 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.    
163 This calculation assumes that the court fixed the interest rate at 7.5%, reflecting a risk premium of 
1% over the 6.51% rate on conventional prime mortgages in April 2006.  
16411 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(2), 1325(b)(3); see HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 23.02(3)(b) (2006). 
165 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (stating that plan must be proposed in good faith). 
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individuals with consumer debt are subject to these screening criteria, there is no need to develop 
separate standards to determine which homeowners should be eligible for a loan modification. 
Unlike a program of voluntary modifications, bankruptcy offers uniform federal standards to 
ensure that only needy families get help. Bankruptcy also requires a debtor to suffer real burdens 
that prospectively would deter consumers who are looking for a better deal but who could pay 
according to the existing terms of their mortgage loans. Families that wanted to modify a loan in 
bankruptcy would incur expenses such as attorney’s fees and filing fees and would have to 
contend with the harm to their credit scores and the stigma of a public bankruptcy filing.166  
The second benefit of modifying loans in bankruptcy administrative efficiency. As a 
foreclosure rescue system, a bankruptcy solution would not require any new bureaucracy or the 
expansion of any government agencies. The costs of such relief to the general public would be 
nonexistent or negligible. The bankruptcy system is self-financed from fees paid by debtors.167 
Expanding bankruptcy relief to allow the modification of mortgages does not require taxpayer 
dollars to be spent on creating and implementing a relief system from scratch. Instead, such a 
solution uses the existing bankruptcy architecture and administration, including judges, the U.S. 
Trustee, and panel trustees. These personnel are experienced in adjudicating disputes between 
consumers and creditors, reducing time that would be needed to hire, train, and supervise staff. 
Compared to a nebulous system of aid such as a foreclosure rescue fund, a bankruptcy 
modification solution would not waste time in trying to set eligibility criteria or implement a 
program of relief.  
A third advantage of expanding bankruptcy relief to help homeowners is the way in which a 
bankruptcy-based system would override mortgage servicers’ disincentives to modify loans. 
Despite contentious opposition to proposals to modify mortgages in bankruptcy, the mortgage 
industry seems to agree with consumer advocates that homeowners and servicers are not 
communicating successfully (or at all) about the possibility of voluntary loan modifications. The 
Mortgage Bankers Association admits that neither lenders nor servicers have any communication 
with 50% of homeowners in foreclosure.168 Consumers complain about difficulty in contacting 
their mortgage servicers, in identifying agents with authority to offer modifications, and in 
persuading servicers that modification (rather than a repayment or forbearance plan) is the relief 
that they need to avoid foreclosure.169 Additionally, mortgage servicers have struggled to provide 
the kind of high-quality and labor-intensive customer service necessary to do loan modifications. 
Indeed, servicers have financial incentives to impose fees and charges on struggling homeowners 
to overcome the costs of servicing loans in default,170 even if such servicing practices create 
roadblocks to homeowners trying to cure their defaults and save their homes. If mortgages could 
be modified in bankruptcy, consumers could affirmatively initiate the modification process by 
filing a chapter 13 bankruptcy. From this signal, the mortgage company would know that a family                                                         
166 See Jacoby, supra note 79, at 330–31 (detailing costs of chapter 13).  
167 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: FISCAL YEAR 2005 10, available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/annualreport/docs/ar2005.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). 
168 Kittle Testimony, supra note 146, at 10 (admitting that servicer had no contact with 50% of 
homeowners whose mortgages were foreclosed. 
169 See Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
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is committed to trying to save its home. Instead of missed opportunities to communicate, 
consumers and servicers would negotiate over possible modification within the structured 
framework of a bankruptcy case. Mortgage servicers’ incentives to pile on default fees and their 
ability to unreasonably refuse to do loan modifications would be checked by the bankruptcy 
courts, acting pursuant to a statutory scheme of permissible modifications.  
A final benefit of bankruptcy modification is its relative invulnerability to legal attacks. This 
benefit would protect mortgage creditors or servicers that grant modifications and would give the 
government a strong argument that its system of aid to homeowners was constitutionally 
permissible. Today, many residential mortgages are securitized. Mortgage servicers and trustees 
who are responsible for such securitized mortgages are obliged to follow the terms of pooling and 
servicing agreements and other contracts with investors who own the mortgage-backed securities. 
While regulators have tried to ease concerns about liability to servicers or trustees that could arise 
from modifying mortgages, the potential for liability (or at least lawsuits that must be defended) 
may lead to reluctance to engage in widespread loan modifications. An additional concern is that 
investors may file lawsuits against trustees or against other groups of investors if loan 
modifications are made that do not benefit them. Because different tranches of investors face 
different losses depending on the nature of their investments, the investors’ interests are not 
uniformly aligned to modify mortgages.171 Loan modifications pursuant to bankruptcy law would 
not be voluntary and would protect servicers and trustees from allegations that they acted unfairly 
or unreasonably in modifying mortgages. Congress would also have the protection of its 
constitutional authority to enact uniform bankruptcy laws to defend a bankruptcy-based solution 
to the foreclosure crisis.172 Without this basis, the government may be vulnerable to constitutional 
challenges if it engages in efforts to force mortgage holders to modify their private contracts with 
homeowners. A bankruptcy modification solution would greatly reduce the potential of legal 
liability for modifying loans.  
Any effective policy response to the foreclosure crisis will have to grapple with the problem 
of unaffordable loan terms. Modifying the mortgage loans of bankruptcy debtors would not only 
provide the needed affordability relief to help families succeed at homeownership, such a solution 
would also offer administrative advantages that other proposed responses to the foreclosure crisis 
cannot match. This combination of substantive and procedural benefits may make bankruptcy-
based loan modification the most conservative approach that would also provide a viable means 




The record number of foreclosures in 2007 and 2008 is threatening homeownership as a 
fundamental institution of American middle-class life. The inability of millions of families to 
afford the strain housing costs place on their incomes is a driving factor in the foreclosure crisis. 
While chapter 13 bankruptcy offers families the opportunity to repay arrearages on their 
mortgage loans in a repayment plan, this relief does not address the ongoing struggle with loan 
affordability that resulted from the loose underwriting standards and non-traditional loan products 
that characterized the mortgage market in the last several years. The Mortgage Study data show 
that even in 2006, before the height of the current foreclosure crisis, more than seven in ten 
homeowners in bankruptcy had mortgage payments and related housing costs that exceeded 
income affordability standards. Repealing the prohibition on modifying home mortgage loans in 
bankruptcy would improve the effectiveness of chapter 13 bankruptcy as a home-saving device                                                         
171 Eggert, supra note 169, at 290.  
172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
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and reduce the economic and policy consequences of the foreclosure crisis by giving millions of 
families a chance to save their homes.  
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